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[275] 
The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis 
Governance 
 
By Lawrence J. Trautman* 
 
Extracting the energy resources to fuel our cars, heat and light our 
homes, and power our businesses can be a dangerous enterprise.  Our 
national reliance on fossil fuels is likely to continue for some time and 
all of us reap benefits from the risks taken by the men and women 
working in energy exploration.  We owe it to them to ensure that their 
working environment is as safe as possible. 
— Report to the President, National Commission on the BP 




Does management and a board of directors have a clear, communicated plan 
for disaster scenarios?  A clear strategy and implementation plan for reasonably 
foreseeable industry disasters—before they take place, helps to prevent mistakes 
made under conditions of severe stress.  Survival-threatening disasters such as the: 
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American University.  Mr. Trautman is Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics at Western 
Carolina University and a past president of the New York and Metropolitan Washington/Baltimore 
Chapters of the National Association of Corporate Directors.  He may be contacted at 
www.ljtrautman.com.  The author wishes to extend particular thanks to the following for their assistance 
in the research and preparation of this article: Alan Beller; Dennis R. Beresford; Rebecca M. Bratspies; 
John S. Carroll; Michael Froomkin; Cynthia Glassman; Jeffrey N. Gordon; John R. Harrald; Adm. Bobby 
R. Inman (Ret.); Nancy Leveson; Richard Levick; David Morens; Hitoshi Nasu; Justen R. Noakes; John 
Olson; David Passmore; James Pursell; Geoffrey Rothwell; Gregory L. Shaw; and Laura Unger.  Thanks 
also to the George Washington University Schools of Business and Law, and in particular, the Denit Trust 
Challenges in Corporate Governance Series for providing inspiration for this article.  All errors and 
omissions are my own. 
1. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT 
TO THE PRESIDENT, DEEPWATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER & THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, vii 
(2011) [hereinafter Deepwater]. 
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Tylenol poisoning case (1982),2 the Bhopal chemical release (1984),3 the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill (1989),4 the World Trade Center attack on September 11, 20015—
and more recently the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill, Massey Energy West Virginia 
coal mining disaster, or natural disasters such as hurricanes, fires, or the March 11, 
2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami, constitute every board’s worse nightmare.  
As the commission that investigated the loss of the Columbia space shuttle observed, 
“complex systems almost always fail in complex ways.”6  This issue of “complexity” 
seems to be a common characteristic among many of these tragic events.  The 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 
observes, “Though it is tempting to single out one crucial misstep or point the finger 
at one bad actor as the cause … any such explanation provides a dangerously 
incomplete picture of what happened—encouraging the very kind of complacency 
that led to the accident in the first place.”7   
This paper proceeds in nine parts.  First, by offering a few thoughts about 
contemporary threats.  Second, it examines the board of director’s responsibility in 
crisis.  Third, it discusses the necessity of commitment at the top of every enterprise 
if progress is to be made toward crisis preparation, mitigation, and response.  Fourth, 
it looks at several major corporate disasters: the Japanese earthquake and tsunami of 
2011; Deepwater Horizon drilling rig debacle; and General Motors ignition switch 
crisis.  Fifth, a framework for analysis is offered, followed by some thoughts about 
what to do when crisis hits.  Sixth, I discuss what to do in those situations where 
management is implicated, use of special committees of the board, and emergence 
of the role for special counsel.  Workplace and data security issues are then discussed 
with emphasis on Toyota’s 2010 social media recall strategy, and the Target, Sony, 
and U.S. Office of Personnel Management data breaches.  Next, the following 
 
2. See Brian Wansink, Consumer Reactions to Food Safety Crises, 48 ADVANCES IN FOOD AND 
NUTRITION RESEARCH 103 (2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474720. 
3. See David N. Smith, The Way We Think: Ethics, Health and the Environment in International 
Business, 5 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 25 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578267; 
Christopher C. Hood & Henry Rothstein, Business Risk Management in Government: Pitfalls and 
Possibilities (CARR Discussion Paper No. 0, 2000), http://ssrn.com/abstract=471221; Kent Greenfield, 
The Disaster at Bhopal: Lessons for Corporate Law?, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 755, (2008), http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1312023.  
4. See Ronen Perry, Economic Loss, Punitive Damages, and the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 45 GA. 
L. REV. 409 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1611566; Dale B. Thompson, Valuing the Environment: 
Courts’ Struggles with Natural Resource Damages, 32 ENVTL. L. 57 (2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
306319; Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window on Punitive Damages, 
7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588961; Zygmunt J. B. Plater, The Exxon 
Valdez Resurfaces in the Gulf of Mexico, and the Hazards of ‘Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity’, 38 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1857492; Sanne H. Knudsen, A Precautionary 
Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95 (2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2427832.  
5. See Douglas Linder, The Trial of Zacarias Moussaoui: An Account, FAMOUS TRIALS, 
http://www.famous-trials.com/moussaoui/1810-home (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). 
6. Deepwater, supra note 1, at viii. 
7. Id. 
TRAUTMAN MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2017  3:23 PM 
Spring 2017] CRISIS GOVERNANCE 277 
enterprise nightmare scenarios are presented: supply chain disruptions; Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations; internet failure, or data loss from virus or 
hacker attack; nationalization of assets; natural disasters; adverse political 
developments; pandemics such as the 2014–15 Ebola scare; prolonged power 
disruption; strikes and labor actions; and war.  Succession planning is the next topic 
having corporate crisis implications. 
My goal here is not to provide a lengthy recital of the details of each of these 
tragedies.  Rather, I attempt to draw upon lessons from each disaster and explore 
how they may be applied more generally across all industries.  Ample footnotes are 
provided for those desiring more information about any particular aspect.  The 
following pages should not be a comfortable read.  Some of the behavior of key 
decision makers is disturbing.  Several crisis situations depict the result of lack of 
preparation that reaches levels of gross negligence and criminality.  In other cases, 
these highly publicized disasters could have happened to anyone in that industry.  In 
all too many examples, the unfortunate corporate response is primarily “spin” and 
cover-up until public outcry demands a serious response.  While effective risk 
management is likely the topic highest on every board's agenda, it is imperative that 
thought be given constantly to crisis management and what a board might expect to 
confront when a corporate disaster strikes. 
 
Nature of the Threat 
Changes in the nature of security threats and terrorist capabilities have 
dramatically altered how our government leaders manage national 
security and defense issues,” notes the Business Roundtable in their 
publication Committed to Protecting America: CEO Guide to Security 
Challenges.8  Unlike the hostile nation states of the cold war era, today 
we find a different threat—where “One small, organized group of well-
financed terrorists;9 a lone knowledgeable hacker; or an embittered 
fanatic each has access to devices that can disrupt business activities and 
inflict severe economic damage.”10  In the United States, “with the 
private sector in control of more than 85 percent of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure—the power grid, information and financial services, rails, 
shipping, and airlines—business leaders recognize the need to partner 
with government to improve security and manage risks.11 
 
8. Business Roundtable, Committed to Protecting America: CEO Guide to Security Challenges, 
(Feb. 2005), http://www.cj.msu.edu/~outreach/wmd/ceo_guide.pdf [hereinafter Business Roundtable].  
9. See Andrew Higgins & Milan Schreuer, Attackers in Paris ‘Did Not Give Anyone a Chance,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/paris-terror-attacks-a-
display-of-absolute-barbarity.html.  
10. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8. 
11. Id. See also Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack the Next Pearl Harbor?, 18 N.C. J. L. & 
TECH. 232 (2016) (depicting a fictional account of what a cyber attack on the U.S. might resemble). 
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Crisis Nexus: Energy is the Lifeblood of our Nation 
In their 2011 Report to the President, The National Commission on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling observed the following 
inconvenient truth regarding U.S. energy requirements, 
 
The centrality of oil and gas exploration to the Gulf economy is not 
widely appreciated by many Americans, who enjoy the benefits of 
the energy essential to their transportation, but bear none of the 
direct risks of its production.  Within the Gulf region, however, the 
role of the energy industry is well understood and accepted.  The 
notion of clashing interests—of energy extraction versus a natural-
resource economy with bountiful fisheries and tourist amenities—
misses the extent to which the energy industry is woven into the 
fabric of the Gulf culture and economy, providing thousands of jobs 
and essential public revenues.  Any discussion of the future of 
offshore drilling cannot ignore these economic realities . . .  
For the simple fact is that the bulk of our newly discovered 
petroleum reserves, and the best prospects for future discoveries, lie 
not on land, but under water . . .  The choice of how aggressively to 
exploit these resources, wherever they may be found, has profound 
implications for the future of U.S. energy policy, for our need to 
understand and assure the integrity of fragile environmental 
resources, and for the way Americans think about our economy and 
our security.  Although much work is being done to improve the fuel 
efficiency of vehicles and to develop alternative fuels, we cannot 
realistically walk away from these offshore oil resources in the near 
future.  So we must be much better prepared to exploit such 
resources with far greater care.12 
 
Civilization requires energy to provide heat, lighting and power required for 
industrial production.13  Herein lays the tension.  Despite the best efforts of 
 
12. Deepwater, supra note 1, at x–xi. 
13. See Fred Bosselman et al. Energy, Economics and the Environment: Cases and Materials, in 
ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS, (Foundation Press, 2006), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319022; Edward L. Glaeser, Sari Pekkala Kerr & William R. Kerr, 
Entrepreneurship and Urban Growth: An Empirical Assessment with Historical Mines (Harvard Business 
School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper No. 13-015, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2127249; Jeremy Carl, Varun Rai & David G. Victor, Energy and India's Foreign Policy, Program on 
Energy and Sustainable Development, (Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper 
No. 75, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1400184; David I. Stern, The Role of Energy in Economic Growth 
(USAEE-IAEE Working Paper No. 10-055, 2010) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1715855; David Hodas, 
Ecosystem Subsidies of Fossil, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 599 (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
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management to focus on industrial safety, nuclear energy and the extractive 
industries such as oil and gas or coal mining appear to be inherently dangerous.  Over 
long periods of time, fatal accidents are an unfortunate fact of life.14  We know from 
experience that human error or natural disasters will continue to place some of these 
companies in crisis.  Therefore, every board should consider what actions they will 
take (and have a plan in place) for when the foreseeable crisis happens.  I am 
indebted to industrial safety expert and MIT engineering Professor Nancy Leveson, 
who states, 
 
[W]hile some industries have very high accident rates (such as those 
you mention), others which are equally if not of greater inherent risk 
(such as commercial aviation and U.S. nuclear submarines) have 
orders of magnitude fewer accidents.  Gas, oil and the extractive 
industries have high accident rates not because their processes are 
inherently more dangerous (although they excuse their actions or 
lack of actions this way) but because they do not do what is 
necessary to prevent them.  Period.15  
 
Business Crisis and Continuity Management 
In presenting their case advocating use of a comprehensive program for 
business crisis and continuity management (BCCM), Gregory L. Shaw and John R. 
Harrald state, “All organizations in all sectors (public, private and not-for-profit) 
face the possibility of disruptive events that have impacts ranging from mere 
inconvenience and short-lived disruption of normal operations to the very 
destruction of the organization.”16  Further, “Organizational functions supporting 
business disruption, preparedness, response and recovery—such as risk 
management, contingency planning, crisis management, emergency response, and 
business resumption and recovery—are established and resourced based on the 
 
1117564; David I. Stern, The Role of Energy in Economic Growth (Crawford School Centre for Climate 
Economics & Policy Paper No. 3.10, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878863. 
14. See Alison D. Morantz, Coal Mine Safety: Do Unions Make a Difference?, 66 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 88 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1846700; Maria Lee, Beyond Safety? The Broadening 
Scope of Risk Regulation, 62 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 242 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2088170; 
Anne Marie Lofaso, What We Owe Our Coal Miners, 11 HARV. L. REV. 87 (2011), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1792859; Anne Marie Lofaso, Approaching Coal Mine Safety from a Comparative Law and 
Interdisciplinary Perspective, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2008), http://ssrn.com/ abstract=993830; Roger M. 
Cooke & George-Neale Kelly, Climate Change Uncertainty Quantification: Lessons Learned from the 
Joint EU-USNRC Project on Uncertainty Analysis of Probabilistic Accident Consequence Codes 
(Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 10-29, 2010), http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1612813. 
15. E-mail from Nancy Leveson, Professor of Aeronautics & Astronautics & Eg’r Sys., MIT, to 
Lawrence J. Trautman, (June 27, 2015, 15:59 CST) (on file with author).  
16. Gregory L. Shaw & John R. Harrald, The Core Competencies Required of Executive Level 
Business Crisis and Continuity Managers—The Results, 3 J. HOMELAND SEC. & EMER. MGT. 1 (2006), 
http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol3/iss1/1. 
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organization’s perception of its relevant environments and the risks within those 
environments.”17  Shaw and Harrald remind us that “The reality of business is that 
increasing and dynamic threats, business complexity, government regulation, 
corporate governance requirements, and media and public scrutiny demand an 
integrated approach to BCCM and its supporting functions.”18  Shaw and Harrald 
also provide an extensive list of sources designed “to convince businesses to 
establish readiness programs and take steps to continue, resume and recover their 
critical business functions and processes to ensure their organizational survival.19 
II. THE BOARD’S RESPONSIBILITY IN CRISIS 
Director’s Legal Duties and Responsibilities 
Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge has observed that the business judgment 
rule “pervades every aspect of state corporate law.”20  Corporations are created by 
state-granted charters with their governance dictated by state law and their corporate 
directors responsible for managing the affairs of the corporation.21  Delaware courts 
 
17 . Id. 
18. Id.  
19. Id. at 3, listing Business Roundtable, supra note 8; National Strategy for the Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (2003), the Business Continuity Institute’s Business 
Continuity Management: Good Practices Guidelines (2002) and the Standards Australia, Draft Business 
Continuity Handbook (2003), and government publications, directives and legislation such as the 
National Response Plan (2004), the National Incident Management System (2004), the 9/11 Commission 
Report (2004), The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Ready.gov—Ready 
Business Web Site (2004), the Draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan (2005), See National 
Response Framework (2008). 
20. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, (UCLA 
School of Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 03-18, 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=429260, citing 
e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (fiduciary duties of controlling shareholder); 
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. 1868) (operational decision); see also Douglas M. 
Branson, The Rule that Isn't a Rule - the Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631 (2002), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=346080; Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral 
Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW U. L. REV. (2002), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=290938; Lyman Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 
60 BUS. LAW. (2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=711122; Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder 
Primacy and the Business Judgment Rule: Arguments for Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN. J. 
L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1647002. 
21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) (“The business and affairs of a corporation organized 
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”). While more than half of all 
publicly-owned United States corporations are chartered under the laws of the state of Delaware, 
corporate counsel and directors will want to closely examine the laws of relevant states when considering 
any particular matter; see also Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive 
Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW 247, 248 (Feb. 1989) (“Delaware 
corporate law . . . governs the largest proportion of the largest business transactions in history”); Lawrence 
J. Trautman, Who Sits on Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors: Who They Are and What 
They Do, 16 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 44 (2016) (describing the experience and demographics of corporate 
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have stated that the business judgment rule is a “presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”22  Under Delaware law, directors owe their corporation and shareholders 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.23  Glassman et al. warn that “Corporate crises 
come in many varieties.  Some have internal causes; some result from external 
events.  There are examples of these crises in newspapers almost daily.  However, 
when a crisis hits, the Board cannot rely on routine processes.”24  Discussing “The 
Role of Corporate Directors in Dealing with Corporate Crises” a panel including 
former SEC commissioners and seasoned legal experts note that “External events or 
pressures can cause a crisis . . . cyber-attacks can seriously disrupt or harm a 
business.  A weather event, such as hurricane Sandy can cause acute unexpected 
problems.  A significant shareholder activist, hostile takeover, or proxy fight could 
be seen as a crisis as well.”25  In all cases of corporate crisis, “[w]hatever the cause, 
the Board is expected to act quickly and effectively to mitigate the damage to the 
 
directors in Texas), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2493569; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group 
Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract=266683; 
Lawrence J. Trautman, Corporate Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking About This?, 17 THE 
SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S LAW REVIEW ON RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 219 (2015), http://www.ssrn. 
com/abstract=2047750.   
22. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for 
Information Technology Governance, 29 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313 (2011), citing 
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
75 (Del. 1992); see also Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2261708; Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith 
Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=728431. 
23. See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 22, at 313, citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d 858 (Del.Supr. 1985);  see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The 
Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight (UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 07-
09, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006097; Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in 
Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1213 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457804; Bernard S. Black, 
The Core Fiduciary Duties of Outside Directors, ASIA BUS. L. REV. 3 (2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=270749; but see William T. Allen, Modern Corporate Governance and the Erosion of the Business 
Judgment Rule in Delaware Corporate Law (CLPE Research Paper No. 06/2008, 2008), http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1105591; Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of 
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983), http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=2147199; Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of 
the Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593332; Bernard S. 
Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=894921. 
24. Cynthia Glassman, Alan Beller, John Olson, Lawrence J. Trautman & Laura Unger, The Role 
of Corporate Directors In a Crisis, Denit Trust Challenges in Corporate Governance Series, GEORGE 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, Oct. 21, 2013, http://business.gwu.edu/about-us/re 
search/institute-for-corporate-responsibility/the-series-on-corporate-governance/#Q7 (last viewed June 
5, 2017). 
25. Id. 
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company.”26  It is the key duties of corporate directors—the duty of care, duty of 
loyalty, and duty of good faith that represent the foundation of corporate governance. 
 
Duty of Care  
 
Every director’s legal duty of care requires a careful, diligent approach to the 
effective discharge of their individual duties and responsibilities.  Professors Lyman 
P.Q. Johnson and Mark Sides note that,  
 
[T]he duty of care specifies the manner in which directors must 
discharge their legal responsibilities . . . includ[ing] electing, 
evaluating, and compensating corporate officers; reviewing and 
approving corporate strategy, budgets, and capital expenditures; 
monitoring internal financial information systems and financial 
reporting obligations, and complying with legal requirements; 
making distributions to shareholders; approving transactions not in 
the ordinary course of business; appointing members to committees 
and discharging committee assignments, including the important 
audit, compensation and nominating committees . . .  
The duty of due care arises in both the discrete decision-making 
context and in the oversight and monitoring areas [our emphasis 
added] . . .  In the decision-making-setting—whether it involves 
directors making a routine business decision or responding to a high-
stakes unsolicited bid for corporate control—the duty of care inquiry 
clearly focuses on a board’s ‘decision-making process.’27  Directors 
in that setting are under an obligation to obtain and act with due care 
on all material information reasonably available.28 
 
26. Id. 
27. See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 22, at 313, citing Lyman P.Q. Johnson and 
Mark A. Sides, Corporate Governance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1197 (2004), citing Citron v. Fairchild Camera & 
Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“Due 
care in the decision making context is process due care only.”). 
28. See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 22, at n.231, citing Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1994); see also Donald C. 
Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law's Duty of Care as 
Responsibility for Systems, 31 J. CORP. L. 949 (2006), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/ 
facpub/144/; Christopher M. Bruner, Is the Corporate Director's Duty of Care a 'Fiduciary' Duty? Does 
It Matter?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1027 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358616; William T. Allen, 
Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware 
Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. 
L. REV. 449 (2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2529133; Lynn A. Stout & Margaret M. Blair, Trust, 
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=241403; Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business 
Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2261708; Lucian A. Bebchuk 
et al., Director Liability, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011 (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=946021. 
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Arising in a takeover context, the Delaware Supreme Court found in the 
landmark 1985 case of Smith v. Van Gorkom,29 that the experienced and 
sophisticated directors30 of Trans Union Corporation were not entitled to the 
protection of the business judgment rule31 and had breached their fiduciary duty to 
their shareholders “(1) by their failure to inform themselves of all information 
reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision to recommend the 
Pritzker merger; and (2) by their failure to disclose all material information such as 
a  reasonable shareholder would consider important in deciding whether to approve 
the Pritzker offer.”32  Before the decision involving the Trans Union board, absent 
accompanying disloyal acts, it was generally accepted that “courts had rarely found 
individual directors liable for breaching their duty of care.”33  The Business 
Roundtable says of the September 11th terrorist attacks that, 
 
According to Judge Alvin Hellerstein, who administered the 
lawsuits resulting from the attacks, principles of ‘duty of care’ and 
 
29. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, 
supra note 23; see also Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 343 (2006), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1018110; Stephen J. Lubben & Alana J. Darnell, Delaware's Duty of Care, 31 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 589 (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=706481; Cheryl Lyn Wade, What Independent 
Directors Should Expect from Inside Directors: Smith v. Van Gorkom as a Guide to Intra-Firm 
Governance, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 367 (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=888812; Lawrence A. Hamermesh, 
Twenty Years after Smith v. Van Gorkom: An Essay on the Limits of Civil Liability of Corporate Directors 
and the Role of Shareholder Inspection Rights, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 283 (2006), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1122390; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Smith v. Van Gorkom (UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ 
Research Paper No. 08-13, 2008) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130972; Bernard S. Sharfman, The Enduring 
Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 287 (2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1059962; 
Bernard S. Sharfman, Being Informed Does Matter: Fine Tuning Gross Negligence Twenty Plus Years 
after Van Gorkom, 62 BUS. LAW. 135 (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=914583. 
30. See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 22, at 313, citing Peter V. Letsou, Cases and 
Materials on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions at 643 n.21 (2006) (observing “Trans Union’s five 
‘inside’ directors had backgrounds in law and accounting, 116 years of collective employment by the 
company and 68 years of combined experience on its Board.  Trans Union’s five ‘outside’ directors 
included four chief executives of major corporations and an economist who was a former dean of a major 
school of business and chancellor of a university.  The ‘outside’ directors had 78 years of combined 
experience as chief executive officers of major corporations and 50 years of cumulative experience of 
Trans Union.  Thus, defendants argue that the Board was eminently qualified to reach an informed 
judgment on the proposed ‘sale’ of Trans Union notwithstanding their lack of any advance notice on the 
proposal, the shortness of their deliberation, and their determination not to consult with their investment 
banker or to obtain a fairness opinion.”). 
31. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 888. 
32. Letsou, supra note 30, at 644. 
33. See Jacqueline M. Veneziani, Note & Comment: Causation and Injury in Corporate Control 
Transactions: Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 69 WASH. L. REV. 1167, 1194 n.3 (1994) (“Before Van 
Gorkom was decided, one commentator had stated that ‘[t]he search for cases in which directors… have 
been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by selfdealing is a search for a very 
small number of needles in a very large haystack.’”); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy 
Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 
(1968). 
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‘foreseeable risk’ were forever altered by the tragic attacks.  For 
example, according to Judge Hellerstein: ‘Defendants argue that the 
ground victims lost their lives and suffered injuries from an event 
that was not reasonably foreseeable, for terrorists had not previously 
used a hijacked airplane as a suicidal weapon to destroy buildings 
and murder thousands.’  He continued, ‘Defendants contend that 
because the events of September 11 were not within the reasonably 
foreseeable risks, any duty of care that they would owe to ground 
victims generally should not extend to the victims of September 
11.34  According to the Court’s decision, however, corporate leaders 
now also must adopt strategies to manage widespread infrastructure 
disruptions and crises resulting from previously unforeseeable 
terrorist attacks or nonmalicious infrastructure failures.35 
 
Duty of Good Faith 
For a director to have the protection of the business judgment rule against a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a director must be able to demonstrate that she 
acted in “good faith.”36  Professor Janet E. Kerr, writing during 2005, observes that 
“because the duty of good faith has not been clearly defined nor fully developed, its 
definition and application are being driven by numerous forces.”37  Moreover, many 
factors “define what it means for a corporate director to act in good faith . . . 
includ[ing] the judicial application of state corporate law, federal and state 
legislation, shareholder activism . . . corporate governance ratings, and the 
expectations of the public in response to the media’s treatment of current issues in 
corporate governance.38  Stockbridge v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc. holds that the board 
of directors of a Delaware corporation is charged with the legal responsibility to 
manage its business for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders with “due 
 
34. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 1, citing In re September 11 Litigation, United 
States District Court, S.D.N.Y., Opinion and Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Judge Alvin 
K. Hellerstein, page 15 (Sept. 9, 2003), reprinted at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/sept11/21MC 
97_Motions_to_Dismiss_90903.pfd/. 
35. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 81. 
36. See id. at n.45; see also Leo E. Strine, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey 
M.  Gorris, Loyalty's Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 
629 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349971; Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory 
of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. (2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=728431; 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2005), http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=899212. 
37. Janet E. Kerr, Developments in Corporate Governance: The Duty of Good Faith and Its 
Impact on Director Conduct, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1037 (2005-06). 
38. See Kerr, supra note 37, at 1038; see also Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=456060. 
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care, good faith, and loyalty.”39  Professor Kerr continues, “recognizing that 
directors have a fiduciary duty to manage a corporation with good faith in the best 
interests of all its shareholders and of the long-term health of the corporation, the 
court opined that whether directors have acted in good faith is a question of fact.”40  
Moreover, 
 
Whether the duty to act in good faith is merely a subset of the duties 
of care and loyalty, a duty separate and freestanding from the other 
two duties, or a duty similar to the duty of good faith required in the 
contractual context, remains to be answered.  Importantly, the duty 
of good faith could be held to encompass compliance with the 
expectations of the parties involved and conformity to the spirit of 
the fiduciary relationship.  Finally, despite inconsistency and 
uncertainty, under the emerging definition of the duty of good faith, 
directors may be held personally liable for corporate misbehavior if 
their conduct evidences improper motive or ill will, a reckless 
disregard of known risks, a sustained failure to oversee management, 
or is so egregious that it is unexplainable on any other grounds other 
than bad faith.41 
 
 
Delaware Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey observes, “failure to follow the minimum 
. . . evolving standards of director conduct . . . Sarbanes-Oxley . . . NYSE or 
NASDAQ Rules (when . . . [SEC] approved) might likewise raise a good faith issue.  
There is no definitive answer to that question, but counsel should advise the directors 
of that possible exposure and encourage the utmost good faith behavior.”42  
Moreover, 
 
The evolving business and judicial expectations of director conduct 
over the years are part of the common law grist for the fiduciary duty 
mill.  As Chancellor Allen stressed in Caremark, the kind of 
sustained inattention of directors exemplified by the failure to 
institute law compliance programs contemplated by the federal 
sentencing guidelines and expected of prudent businesses could be 
held to be a violation of fiduciary duty of good faith.  That standard 
of conduct—good faith—is key to director conduct, and it must be 
considered when one looks at the directors’ processes and 
 
39. Kerr, supra note 37, at 1045, citing Stockbridge v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc., 611 S.E.2d 600, 
606 (2005) (quoting Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998)). 
40. See Kerr, supra note 37, at 1046, citing Stockbridge, 611 S.E. 2d at 605. 
41. Kerr, supra note 37, at 1051. 
42. See E. Norman Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Governance Principles, 
56 SMU L. REV. 2135, 2141 (2003). 
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motivations to be certain that they are honest and not disingenuous 
or reckless.43 
 
Public Policy Considerations 
From a public-policy perspective, Professor Gregory Scott Crespi notes that 
the rationales offered supporting application of the business judgment rule to 
evaluate director conduct may generally be grouped “into three broad categories: 1) 
avoiding undue judicial encroachment into business decisions, 2) preserving the 
central role of the board of directors in corporate governance, and 3) encouraging 
directors to serve and take appropriate risks.”44  A director’s ability to rely on the 
business judgment rule for protection against liability for good faith actions taken 
will depend on successful demonstration (documentation) of appropriate 
consideration of risks to the corporation.  Hamilton observes that 
 
[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, 
believes a decision substantially wrong, or degrees of wrong 
extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational’, provides no 
ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the 
process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith 
effort to advance corporate interests.  To employ a different rule—
one that permitted an objective evaluation of the decision—would 
expose directors to substantive second quessing by ill-equipped 
judges or juries, which would, in the long run, be injurious to 
investor interests.  Thus, the business judgment rule is process 
oriented and informed by a deep respect for all good faith board 
decisions.45  
 
43. Id.; see also Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, J. OF CORP. L. 253 (August 3, 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2308007; Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk Management Failures 
at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1739881. 
44. Gregory Scott Crespi, Should the Business Judgment Rule Apply to Corporate Officers, and 
Does it Matter?, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 237, 244 (2006) (citing Lyman P. Q. Johnson, Corporate 
Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 215, 440, 453 (2005)). 
45. Robert W. Hamilton, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 787 (7th ed. 2001), noting [By the Court] the vocabulary of 
negligence while often employed, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, Del. Supr., 473 A.2d 805 (1984), is not well-
suited to judicial review of board attentiveness; see, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 
1982), especially if one attempts to look to the substance of the decision as any evidence of possible 
‘negligence.’  Where review of board functioning is involved, courts leave behind as a relevant point of 
reference the decisions of the hypothetical ‘reasonable person’, who typically supplies the test for 
negligence liability; see also Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, 63 
TEX. L. REV. 1483 (1985). 
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Duty of Care and Board Responsibility During Crisis 
Much as a board will plan for known and/or probable risks, best practice will 
include a demonstrated and documented pattern of diligent inquiry into foreseeable 
risks which may result in catastrophic disasters.  Contingency plans should be 
developed for each scenario.  The Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to 
Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System, drafted by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, and published by The Federal Reserve Board, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, states that “Boards of Directors should review business continuity 
strategies to ensure that plans are consistent with the firm’s overall business 
objectives, risk management strategies, and financial resources.  Decisions about 
overall business continuity objectives should not be left to the discretion of 
individual business units.”46  Specific thoughts about what to do when crisis strikes 
are provided in the pages to follow. 
III. COMMITMENT AT THE TOP 
“Developing crisis management, business continuity and disaster recovery 
programs and then training and testing employees require significant executive time 
and can emotionally tax a company’s workforce.  Without direct CEO involvement, 
crisis planning and recovery programs might not be elevated to a high enough level 
across the corporation,” observes the Business Roundtable.47  To be effective, 
organizational crisis planning must have the commitment of all the major players in 
the corporate drama.  Shaw and Harrald observe, “Absent top-level recognition, 
support, and coordination, these functions may receive minimal or even no attention.  
Even when recognized and supported, they may be implemented and managed in a 
non-integrated manner with dispersed authority and responsibility.”48  In discussing 
the challenges facing every board and CEO, the Business Roundtable observes, 
 
CEO leadership is essential to improving the resilience of key 
corporate assets.  Physical security is no longer solely a function of 
securing the perimeter with ‘guns, guards and gates.’  Companies, at 
a minimum, already have considered and deployed new layers of 
physical protection around their most critical facilities, often 
expanding the corporate perimeter, adding new guard enhancements 
and building more robust identity checks.  But there are limits to 
such physical security measures …  Companies with assets scattered 
 
46. Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial 
System, SEC Release No. 34-47638 (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/34-47638.htm. 
47. Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 86. 
48. See Shaw & Harrald, supra note 16, at 2. 
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across many countries also must contend with security risks far from 
corporate headquarters.  Working with foreign law enforcement 
officials, understanding cross-border risks and integrating corporate 
solutions around the globe may require companies to acquire the 
negotiating skills of State Department diplomats.49 
 
Importance of Enterprise Risk Management 
Professor Michelle Harner describes Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) as 
“a holistic approach to risk management that goes beyond financial risk modeling 
and seeks to integrate a firm’s risk assessment and response practices . . .  The goal 
of risk management should not be the elimination of all risk but rather the pursuit of 
prudent and informed risk profiling and decision making.”50  Federal Reserve Bank 
Governor Susan Bies contends that a thoughtfully constructed ERM “process can 
help . . . provid[e] a framework within which managers can explicitly consider how 
the organization’s risk exposures are changing, determine the amount of risk they 
are willing to accept, and ensure that they have the appropriate risk mitigants and 
controls in place to limit risks to targeted levels.51  Governor Bies observes, 
 
Of course, ERM is a fairly broad topic, one that can mean different 
things to different people… I will define ERM as a process that 
enables management to deal effectively with uncertainty and the 
associated risk and opportunity, enhancing the capacity to build 
stakeholder value.  Borrowing from ERM literature . . .  ERM 
includes: 
 Aligning the entity’s risk appetite and strategies; 
 Enhancing the rigor of the entity’s risk-response decisions; 
 Reducing the frequency and severity of operational surprises 
and losses; 
 Identifying and managing multiple and cross-enterprise 
risks; 
 Proactively seizing on the opportunities presented to the 
entity; and 
 Improving the effectiveness of the entity’s capital 
deployment.52 
 
49. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 31. 
50. See Michelle M. Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk Management, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1323, 1325 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1621793, citing COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE 
TREADWAY COMM’N (COSO), Enterprise Risk Management ̶Integrated Framework: Executive Summary 
(2004) (describing ERM framework).  
51. Susan Bies, Governor, U.S. Federal Reserve System, Speech at the National Credit Union 
Administration 2007 Risk Management Summit: Enterprise Risk Management and Mortgage Lending 
(Jan. 11, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bies20070111a.htm. 
52. Bies, supra note 51. 
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The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) is a private sector initiative, jointly sponsored and funded by the American 
Accounting Association (AAA); American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA); Financial Executives International (FEI); Institute of Management 
Accountants (IMA); and The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA).53   ERM recognizes 
that “in the business context, the concept of risk includes not only the probability of 
loss but also the consequences of that loss or risk event.  Managing quantifiable risk 
is a much easier task than considering unquantifiable risk.”54  Many commentators 
including COSO “stress the importance of the board’s and senior management’s role 
in ERM.  Under this framework, the board and senior management are critical in 
creating a risk culture at the firm ̶ i.e., a culture that values and rewards meaningful 
assessment and communications regarding risk events.”55 Professor Harner observes 
that 
 
The design and implementation of ERM, is firm-specific, but 
generally involves the board of directors and senior management 
first mapping the firm’s business strategies and risks.  Developing 
an understanding of the linkages between top risk exposures and key 
strategies and objectives can help both management and risk 
oversight by identifying where risks are overlapping with an 
individual strategy and where certain risks may affect multiple 
strategies.56 
 
“Pinpointing a company’s most strategic vulnerabilities is a board-level challenge 
and worthy of a CEO’s time and attention.”57  In analyzing global security issues, 
questions arise such as “Which countries offer the safest and most secure 
infrastructure for partnering or expanding operations?  How should global 
companies prioritize competing demands for capital protection?  And how should 
companies implement geographic redundancy for key assets and employees?”58  
Increased enforcement focus of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) can 
also result in an expensive and prolonged crisis for the unwary.59 
 
53. See About Us, COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG.S OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N (COSO), 
http://www.coso.org/aboutus.htm (last viewed June 5, 2017). 
54. See Harner, supra note 50, at 1329, citing Aswath Damodaran, Risk Management: A 
Corporate Governance Manual (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681017. 
55. Id. at 1332. 
56. Id. at 1333. 
57. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 5. 
58. Id. 
59. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Minefield for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145 (2011); Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies as an 
Audit Committee Financial Expert Under SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. 
L.J. 205 (2013). 
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Success rarely happens out of the blue, it is planned-for and requires 
enlightened management and a board that is willing to take on the hard work required 
to achieve success.  When the unexpected, enterprise-threatening crisis strikes, it is 
too late to begin the planning process.  Events will quickly spin out of control, further 
adding to the loss of reputation and avoidable costs necessary to survive and recover 
with minimal damage.  Like succession planning, disaster planning should be 
viewed as a fundamental responsibility of the board and top management.  The 
Business Roundtable notes, “Government and industry leaders alike are grappling 
with a host of difficult security questions: 
 How can CEOs best create a security philosophy that permeates the 
corporate culture? 
 How should the most important management activities be prioritized? 
 How should traditional business functions be restructured and integrated 
across traditional corporate functions? 
 On what specific risks should CEOs focus their attention? 
 Where and how should strategic management processes be deployed? 
 How should success and failure be measured? 
 How should scarce resources be apportioned? 
 How should effective leadership be provided as the nature of terrorist 
threats evolves?60 
 
First: Recognize You Are In A Crisis 
Harvard professor, former Medtronic CEO and veteran corporate director Bill 
George says, “Crises often start out in relatively benign ways, and then seemingly 
minor events escalate into major ones.  Unless leaders face reality early, they can 
easily miss the signals of the deeper crisis that is waiting ahead.  Until its leaders 
acknowledge the crisis, their organizations cannot address the difficulties.”61 
An analysis of leadership behavior during many crisis situations indicate a 
pattern of simply not acting quickly enough.  This could be the result of a human 
tendency to procrastinate but perhaps there is another explanation.  Professor George 
proposes that, “Many people find reality is just too horrible to face or they are too 
ashamed, so denial becomes a convenient defense mechanism.  If you feel yourself 
getting defensive, ask yourself, ‘What am I defending against?  How might denying 







60. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 5. 
61. See BILL GEORGE, 7 LESSONS FOR LEADING IN CRISIS 22, Josey-Bass (2009). 
62. Id. 
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Role of Audit and/or Risk Committee 
 
The board’s role in risk management continues to be among the most 
important topics in corporate governance.63  “All directors need to understand those 
specific risks their company faces and ensure that management has taken ownership 
of these risk threats.”64  Just as the Audit Committee conducts an inquiry into 
material weaknesses of financial controls, it seems prudent to assign the monitoring 
of the existence and the adequacy of a formalized crisis plan to either the board’s 
Audit or Risk Management committee.  I am indebted to Rene M. Stulz for a 
‘typology of risk management,” wherein, 
 
[T]he way we describe the role of risk management suggests 
important ways in which risk management can go wrong… Let’s 
assume, for now, that the right measure is used given the situation 
of the firm.  Two types of mistakes can be made in measuring risk: 
known risks can be mismeasured and some risks can be ignored, 
either because they are unknown or viewed as not material.  Once 
risks are measured, they have to be communicated to the firm’s 
leadership. A failure in communicating risk to management is a risk 
management failure as well.  After management decides what kind 
of risks to take, risk management has to make sure that the firm takes 
these risks.  In other words, risk managers must manage the firm’s 
risk, a task that may involve identifying appropriate risk mitigating 
actions, hedging some risks, and rejecting some proposed trades or 
projects.  Lastly, a firm’s risk managers may fail to use appropriate 
risk metrics.  With this perspective, there are six types of risk 
management failures: 
1. Mismeasurement of known risks. 
2. Failure to take risks into account. 
3. Failure in communicating the risks to top management. 
4. Failure in monitoring risks. 
5. Failure in managing risks. 
6. Failure to use appropriate risk metrics…  
There is little hope for statistical risk models relying on historical 
data to capture such complicated situations.  Rather, a firm has to 
augment these models with scenario analysis that investigates how 
crises can unfold and how they will affect it under various 
assumptions about how it reacts to the crisis.  With such scenarios 
 
63. See Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for Director Selection and 
Recruitment, 11 FL. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75 (2012), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1998489; Lawrence J. 
Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, D&O Insurance: A Primer, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 337 (2012), 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1998080.  
64. D&O Insurance, supra note 63, at 116. 
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in hand, top management can then understand how crises can 
endanger [them] and… how to manage risks before they occur so 
that they can survive them.  Such a scenario approach requires 
economic and financial analysis.  It cannot be done by risk 
management departments populated by physicists and 
mathematicians.  Such an approach also cannot be successful unless 
top management believes that the scenarios considered represent 
legitimate threats . . .65 
 
Good business practice and common sense seem to dictate that a periodic review be 
made of your crisis plan along with discussion by the entire board.  Following highly 
publicized disasters of any type, such as the 2011 Japanese tsunami, a review of your 
exposure and planning for similar crises seems prudent.  It is likely your 
shareholders will want answers to these questions. 
 
Corporate Culture: Value of Openness and Candor 
Professor George observes that “[w]ithout a culture of openness and candor, 
leaders are highly vulnerable to missing the signals of big problems ahead.  By the 
time they acknowledge how deep their problems are—or outsiders like government 
agencies, consumer watchdog groups, or the media do it for them—it is too late.”66  
Professor George continues, 
 
Why aren’t there more truth tellers in organizations?  The reason is 
that they are afraid of getting in trouble with a boss who won’t accept 
bad news.  Leaders who are approached by a bearer of bad news may 
wind up shooting the messenger, because reality is just too painful 
to face.  Look at what happened to Enron’s Sharron Watkins when 
she took her concerns about financial misstatements to chairman 
Ken Lay.  She was not only rebuffed but ostracized within the firm.  
No wonder many employees hesitate to tell the truth to their bosses 
. . . 
I used to tell people at Medtronic, ‘[y]ou’ll never get fired for having 
a problem, but you will get fired for covering one up.  Integrity is 
not the absence of lying.  Rather, it is telling the whole truth, so that 
we can gather together the best people in the company to solve the 
problem. 
It is important to publicly express appreciation to the truth tellers so 
others in your organization will follow suit.  Only with a culture of 
 
65. See Rene M. Stulz, Risk Management Failures: What are They and When do They Happen? 
(Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2008-18), Fisher Coll. of Bus. Working Paper No. 2008-03-
017, (2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1278073.  
66. See George, supra note 61, at 22. 
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candor and openness can organizations cope with crises and act in 
unison to get on top of them.67 
 
IV. JAPANESE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI OF 2011 
Tragedy Strikes 
On March 11, 2011, a huge 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent 
tsunami, estimated at 45 feet, hit the Fukushima nuclear power generating plant in 
northeast Japan, resulting in the release of radiation into the nearby soil, air and sea.  
“The twin catastrophes wiped out the normal power and backup generators of nearly 
all the plant’s six reactors and also damaged roads and communications lines 
through which the plants could seek help.”68  This tragedy resulted in over 11,500 
dead, more than 16,400 unaccounted for, and more than 200,000 people were moved 
to relief shelters soon after the disaster.69  One year after becoming president of 
Japanese technology conglomerate Fujitsu Ltd., Masami Yamamoto observed, “I 
never experienced World War II myself, but I think this is the biggest crisis for Japan 




Almost immediately, global supply chain disruptions became apparent across 
many industry sectors; including, “quake related shortages of silicon wafers, liquid-
crystal display screens, chips, high strength steel and chemicals [which] will affect 
the auto industry.”71  For example, 
 
One part emerging as a big problem goes into mass airflow sensors.  
Made by Hitachi Automotive Systems . . . at a plant north of Tokyo 
that was damaged by the quake and remains shut down, the 
electronic part is used by about a dozen auto makers. 
 
67. Id.; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New 
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 U. CONN. L. REV. 1125 (2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
391363; Marianne Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons From A Perfect Storm of Financial Reporting, 
Corporate Governance and Ethical Cultural Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 163 (2003). 
68 . Phred Dvorak & Peter Landers, Japanese Plant Had Barebones Risk Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
31, 2011, at A1. 
69. Eric Bellman, Quake-Induced Misery Extends to Jobs Market, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2011, at A9. 
70. Juro Osawa, Fujitsu Chief: Biggest Crisis Since War, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2011, at B1. 
71. See Mike Ramsey & Sebastian Moffett, Japan Parts Shortage Hits Auto Makers, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 24, 2011, at B1; see also Hiroyuki Kachi & Yoshio Takahashi, Plant Closures Imperil Global 
Supplies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2011, at A6. 
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Hitachi, which has a 60% share of the world’s market for 
airflow sensors, said it hopes to resume operations . . . [but] the area 
is suffering from water and power shortages.72 
 
Almost two weeks after the quake and tsunami, “Japan’s chip makers [were] 
gradually starting to resume operations at their factories in the northeastern part of 
the country after . . . the subsequent power-supply disruption forced most 
manufacturers in the region to halt production.”73  Production following such a 
disaster is often complicated by shortages of materials and power disruptions.  
Unique to the semiconductor manufacturing process 
 
Chip plants are usually designed to operate around the clock, and 
some of the chip manufacturing equipment is composed of so many 
machines that, once turned off, it can take a week to start up again.  
Also, every time the entire production line is started, each machine 
must be inspected to ensure it can operate in a stable way before 
being switched on again.74 
 
Kureha, a relatively obscure provider of a crucial polymer needed to manufacture 
lithium-ion batteries, reportedly enjoys a dominant 70% global market share for the 
ingredient.  Unfortunately, Kureha’s sole manufacturing facility is in Iwaki, near the 
epicenter of the quake and has been closed since the disaster.  Shortages of this 
obscure polymer reportedly may cause shortage problems for Apple’s iPod and 
many other mobile products that use lithium polymer batteries.75  In addition to 
expected higher costs for silicon wafers, the ripple effect of this Japanese disaster on 
U.S. manufacturers is widespread.  For example, just a month following the tsunami 
it was reported that, 
 
Railroads will ferry less coal to West Coast ports, and return with 
fewer Japanese autos destined for car dealers . . .  Consumers will 
feel the impact, too.  Higher chip prices should push up 
manufacturers’ costs for cellphones and home electronics.  A 
shortage of certain made-in-Japan autos and parts, is already pushing 
up the prices of used cars and may delay or preclude some repairs. 
Some businesses, including airlines, auto makers, insurance 
firms, and railroads, will incur the brunt of the impact . . .  Delta 
Airlines Inc. the largest U.S. airline in Japan, estimates its temporary 
pullback on daily flights to Tokyo’s Haneda Airport will slice 
 
72. See Ramsey & Moffett, supra note 71; see also Juro Osawa & YunHee Kim, Silicon Wafer 
Supply Disrupted, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2011, at B4. 
73. Juro Osawa, Japanese Chip Makers Restart, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2011, at B2. 
74. Id. 
75. Mariko Sanchanta, Chemical Reaction: iPod Is Short Key Material, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 
2011, at B1. 
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between $250 million and $400 million from this years earnings . . .  
The Atlanta-based carrier generates about $2 billion annually, or 8% 




The Japanese earthquake and tsunami disaster seems to represent a scenario 
that illustrates the flaw in maintaining a “just in time” approach to inventory 
maintenance, particularly when combined with only one source for critical 
components.  While “previous big nuclear accidents, such as those at Three Mile 
Island in the U.S. and Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union, resulted from poor 
safety standards and bad management,77 Kazuo Sato, former head of Japan’s Nuclear 
Safety commission during the late 1990’s, observed that “[t]his one was a natural 
disaster— it’s qualitatively different.”78  The Wall Street Journal concluded that 
Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s disaster plans greatly underestimated the scope of a 
potential accident at its Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, 
 
The disaster plans, approved by Japanese regulators, offer guidelines 
for responding to smaller emergencies and outline in detail how to 
back up key systems in case of failure.  Yet the plans fail to envision 
the kind of worse-case scenario that befell Japan: damage so 
extensive that the plant couldn’t respond on its own or call for help 
from nearby plants.  There are no references to Tokyo firefighters, 
Japanese military forces or U.S. equipment, all of which the plant 
operators eventually relied upon to battle their overheating reactors 
. . .  
‘The disaster plan didn’t function,’ said a former Tepco 
executive.  ‘It didn’t envision something this big.’ . . .  Critics allege 
Japan’s regulators and operators tend to avoid talking about or 
preparing fuller disaster scenarios, partly to avoid scaring the public.  
Fukushima Daiichi’s own report on its accident management 
protocols says: “The possibility of a severe accident occurring is so 
small that from an engineering standpoint, it is practically 
unthinkable.’ 
Accident management plans are generally written to deal with 
internal plant problems and don’t take into account external shocks 
such as a quake or terrorist attack, said Hokkaido University Prof. 
 
76. John Shipman & Bob Tita, Quarterly Net Will Reflect Quake, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2011, at B1. 
77. Phred Dvorak & Peter Landers, Japanese Plant Had Barebones Risk Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
31, 2011, at A6. 
78. Id. 
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Kenichiro Sugiyama, who served on a government panel on nuclear 
accident readiness.79 
 
In retrospect, the Japanese earthquake and tsunami tragedy shows “There is no such 
thing as overdoing it in preparing a disaster manual, said Tsuneo Futami, who was 
superintendent at Fukushima Daiichi from 1997 to 2000.  The attitude must be that 
‘anything can happen tomorrow.’”80 
Another lesson learned from this crisis is that conditions often deteriorate 
from the initial assessment of damage.  “The Japanese government says that it now 
thinks that the severity of the month-long crisis at its Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant is on par with that of Chernobyl, raising its assessment of the accident’s 
seriousness to the highest level by international standards.”81  Moreover, 
 
Japan’s nuclear regulators said the plant has likely released so much 
radiation into the environment that it must boost the accident’s 
severity rating on the International Nuclear Event scale to a 7 from 
5 currently.  That’s the highest level by international standards—a 
level only conferred so far on the Chernobyl accident in the former 
Soviet Union, which struck almost exactly 25 years ago, on April 
26, 1986.82 
 
It would not be until 2015, when the Japanese government allowed residents to 
return to the area near the Fukushima nuclear plant.  With the lifting of the 
evacuation order, it was mostly the elderly who returned.  Not until April 2017, a 
full six years after the crisis that 105 elementary and junior high school students 




A common response to every catastrophe appears to be legislation and 
increased subsequent oversight and regulation.  In the United States, significant 
examples of regulatory response to crisis include: securities markets reform 
(Securities Act of 1933)84 and creation of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Securities Exchange Act of 1934)85 following the great depression; 
 
79. Dvorak & Landers, supra note 78, at A1-6. 
80. Id. at A6. 
81. Phred Dvorak, Juro Osawa & Yuka Hayashi, Japanese Crisis Is Ranked Alongside Chernobyl, 
WALL ST. J., Apr, 12, 2011, at A11. 
82. Dvorak, Osawa & Hayashi, supra note 81. 
83. Motoko Rich, Six Years Later, Fukushima Has Its Children Back, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2017, 
at 12. 
84. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a), http://sec.gov/about/laws/sa33.pdf. 
85. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a), http://sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf. 
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Sarbanes-Oxley86 legislation in response to financial fraud by Enron, WorldCom; 
Adelphia Communications, etc.; and Dodd-Frank Financial Reform87 in response to 
the 2008 financial crisis.88  Recently, the U.S. Congress has attempted to respond to 
the contemporary issue of cyberattack.89  Often, it appears that the well-intentioned 
legislation response results in excessive cost and undue burdens, vastly increasing 
the costs of doing business in a highly competitive global economy.  However, it 
also seems that unacceptable systematic risk is only dealt with following crisis and 
loss of life. 
The crisis at the Fukushima nuclear power generating plant has resulted in 
new worldwide focus on nuclear power and safety.90  Yukio Edano, the Japanese 
government’s top spokesman, said, “[t]he government is making the utmost efforts 
to tackle the nuclear issue, but we have to also sincerely respond to criticism that we 
 
86. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
87. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376-2223 (2010). 
88. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Personal Ethics & the U.S. Financial Collapse of 2007-08 
(unpublished paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2502124.  
89. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight: Who’s Who & How It 
Works, 5 J. L. & CYBER WARFARE 147 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2638448. 
90. See Matthew L. Wald, Assessing Fukushima Damage Without Eyes on the Inside, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 2014 at A4; Matthew L. Wald, Many Nuclear Reactors Face Costly Safety Reviews Under 
Revised Quake Estimates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2014 at Nat’l. 21; Masahiko Aoki & Geoffrey Rothwell, 
A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster: Lessons and Policy 
Implications (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1940207 (identifying three shortcomings of Japanese 
electric utilities: (1) decision instability that can lead to system failure after a shock; (2) poor incentives 
to innovate; and (3) the lack of defense-in-depth strategies for accidents); Marius Hofert & Mario V. 
Wuthrich, Statistical Review of Nuclear Power Accidents, (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1923008; 
Hrabrin Bachev & Fusao Ito, Fukushima Nuclear Disaster – Implications for Japanese Agriculture and 
Food Chains (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2319767; Y.-H. Henry Chen, Non-Nuclear, Low-Carbon, 
or Both? The Case of Taiwan (USAEE Working Paper No. 2110221, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2110221; Toshio Serita & Peng Xu, The Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Damage Compensation Resolution 
and Energy Stock Returns, Address at 25th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference (Aug. 25, 
2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136060; Inder K. Khurana, Richard H. Pettway & K. K. Raman, The 
Liability Equivalence of Unfunded Nuclear Decommissioning Costs, 20 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 155 
(2001); Ioannis Kessides, The Future of the Nuclear Industry Reconsidered: Risks, Uncertainties, and 
Continued Potential (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6112, 2012), http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=2096781; André Betzer, Markus Doumet & Ulf Rinne, How Policy Changes Affect 
Shareholder Wealth: The Case of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster (IZA Discussion Paper No. 
5896, 2011 ), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909376; Nicolas Boccard, The Cost of Nuclear Electricity: 
France after Fukushima (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353305; Matthew Jude Egan, The Stewardship 
Claim at Los Alamos National Laboratory: Managing Hazardous Legal and Regulatory Environments 
(May 15, 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UC Berkeley), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1803562; 
Charles I. Jones, Life and Growth (NBER Working Paper No. w17094, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1854196; Lynne Holt, Paul Sotkiewicz & Sanford V. Berg, (When) to Build or Not to Build?: The Role 
of Uncertainty in Nuclear Power Expansion, 3 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 174 (2008), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1331438; Fausto Cavallaro, The Assessment of Nuclear Energy Costs Using a Fuzzy Approach 
(2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595584.  
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are behind the curve.”91 In the United States, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission task 
force was formed after the Japanese disaster and “recommended sweeping changes 
to the agency’s regulatory approach to safety issues.  It suggested the NRC skip its 
usual cost-benefit approach, and instead order utilities to conduct reviews of seismic 
safety using the latest research, and, potentially agree to costly upgrades.”92  
Regulators elsewhere are also responding to the Japanese nuclear disaster; “The 
European Union ordered a round of ‘stress tests’ for natural and man-made hazards, 
including earthquakes.”93  Please note the legislative response and increased 
regulatory scrutiny following each crisis examined. 
 
91 Mitsuru Obe & Takashi Mochizuki, Tokyo Details Stress-Test Plan for Reactors, WALL ST. J., 
July 12, 2011, at A6. 
92 Rebecca Smith & Mark Maremont, Earthquake Risks Probed At U.S. Nuclear Plants, WALL ST. 
J., July 19, 2011, at A1; see also John S. Carroll, Incident Reviews in High-Hazard Industries: 
Sensemaking and Learning under Ambiguity and Accountability, 9 INDUS. & EVNTL. CRISIS QUARTERLY 
175 (1995); John S. Carroll, J. Sterman & Alfred A. Marcus, Playing the Maintenance Game: How Mental 
Models Drive Organizational Decisions, in DEBATING RATIONALITY: NONRATIONAL ASPECTS OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING, (J. J. Halpem & R. N. Stern, eds., ILR Press, 1998); John S. 
Carroll, The Organizational Context for Decision Making in High-Hazard Industries, Remarks at the 
Annual Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (1994), Annual Meeting, in press; John S. Carroll, 
Organizational Learning Activities in High-Hazard Industries: The Logics Underlying Self-Analysis, 35 
J. MGMT. STUDIES 699 (1998); John S. Carroll, Safety Culture as An Ongoing Process: Culture Surveys 
as Opportunities for Enquiry and Change, 12 WORK & STRESS 272 (1998); John S. Carroll et al., Learning 
in the Context of Incident Investigation Team Diagnoses and Organizational Decisions at Four Nuclear 
Power Plants, in LINKING EXPERTISE AND NATURALISTIC DECISION MAKING 349 (E. Salas & G. Klein 
eds., Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001); John S. Carroll & S. Hatakenaka, Driving Organizational Change in the 
Midst of Crisis, 42 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 70 (2001); John S. Carroll, Jenny W. Rudolph & S. Hatakenaka, 
S., The Difficult Hand-Over from Incident Investigation to Implementation: A Challenge for 
Organizational Learning, in SYSTEM SAFETY: CHALLENGES AND PITFALLS OF INTERVENTION 189 (B. 
Wilpert & B. Fahlbruch, eds., Pergamom, 2002); John S. Carroll, Jenny W. Rudolph & S. Hatakenaka, 
Learning from Experience in High-Hazard Organizations, 24 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 87 (2002); John S. 
Carroll, Knowledge Management in High-Hazard Industries: Accident Precursors as Practice, in 
ACCIDENT PRECURSOR ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT: REDUCING TECHNOLOGICAL RISK THROUGH 
DILIGENCE (J. R. Phimister, V. M. Bier, & H. C. Kunreuther, eds., Nat’l Acad. Press, 2004); Nancy 
Leveson et al., Systems Approaches to Safety: NASA and the Space Shuttle Disasters, in ORGANIZATION 
AT THE LIMIT: NASA AND THE COLUMBIA DISASTER 269 (M. Farjoun & W. Starbuck, eds., Blackwell 
Publishers, 2005); R. Lipshitz, G. Klein & John S. Carroll, Introduction to the Special Issue of 
Naturalistic Decision Making in Organizations, 27 ORG. STUD. 917 (2006); John S. Carroll, S. 
Hatakenaka & Jenny W. Rudolph, Naturalistic Decision Making and Organizational Learning in Nuclear 
Power Plants: Negotiating Meaning between Managers and Problem Investigation Teams, 27 ORG. 
STUD. 1037 (2006). 
93 Rebecca Smith & Mark Maremont, Earthquake Risks Probed At U.S. Nuclear Plants, WALL ST. 
J., July 19, 2011, at A1. 
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V. DEEPWATER HORIZON DRILLING RIG DISASTER 
With headquarters in London, BP p.l.c. is one of the world’s most significant 
integrated oil and gas companies, having operations in more than 80 countries.94  By 
2008, BP reported that the Deepwater Gulf of Mexico constituted their “largest area 
of growth in the US.”95  During 2009, BP reported being “involved in a number of 
discoveries.”96  The most significant of these were in the deep water Gulf of Mexic0.  
BP stated, “we continue to grow our position and leverage our experience as the 
largest producer in the Gulf of Mexico.”97  BP’s reported production of 387,000 
barrels of oil per day from the Gulf of Mexico deep water region represented about 
15% of BP’s total daily worldwide production.98 
Law Professor Rebecca M. Bratspies reports that, “Even before the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP’s safety record was abysmal.  In a series of high 
profile incidents, BP’s failure to invest in safety left a trail of death and destruction 
around the world, resulting in multiple criminal and civil sanctions.”99  In just one 
2005 example, “BP’s largest refinery, a 19.3-million-gallon-a-day facility in Texas 
City, Texas, exploded, killing fifteen workers and injuring more than 180.  Federal 
investigators discovered more than 300 safety violations at the facility and fined the 
company $21.3 million.”100  Ultimately, BP paid $50 million in criminal fines, after 
entering a guilty plea to criminal violations of the Clean Air Act.101  Significantly, 
“The Chemical Safety Board attributed the disaster to ill-advised cost-cutting that 
skimped on maintenance.”102 
 
The Cost vs. Safety Trade-off 
Now, for a brief look at the economics of safety.  It is reported that “the cost 
of leasing the Deepwater Horizon rig from Transocean was approximately $500,000 
per day.”103  Unfortunately, drilling ran far behind its scheduled 51-day budget of 
$96 million.  By the time disaster strikes on April 20, 2010, “BP and the Macondo 
well were almost six weeks behind schedule and more than $58 million over budget.  
With the Deepwater Horizon rig late for its next drilling location, delay was costing 
 
94. BP p.l.c., Report on Form-20-F for the fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 2009, 6, https://www.sec. 
gov/Archives/edgar/data/313807/000095012310021364/u08439e20vf.htm#tocpage (last viewed Mar. 5, 
2016). 
95. Id. at 19. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 18. 
98. Id. at 22. 
99. See Bratspies, supra note 14, at 7.  
100. Id. at 13. 
101. Bratspies, supra note 14, at 13.  
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 8. 
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BP tens of millions of dollars in leasing fees alone.”104  This pattern of cost overruns 
and time pressure anxiety forms “the backdrop against which BP made a series of 
fateful decisions in the days and hours before the blowout.”105  Professor Rebecca 
M. Bratspies reports, 
 
On April 16, 2010, BP staff and Schlumberrger, an oilfield services 
provider acting as consultant on the well, recommended that BP 
triple the number of stabilizers in the well in order to avoid ‘a severe 
gas flow potential.  Noting that the design change would take ten 
hours, BP Team Leader, John Guide, overruled the 
recommendation.  The well was completed without the additional 
stabilizers.  BP finished cementing the well on April 20.  Despite 
having flown a Schlumber crew out to the rig to perform a cement 
bond log test, BP opted to send them back and forgo the tests, 
thereby saving $128,000. 
Choices by the rig owner, Transocean, further compounded 
the risk.  For at least a year, Transocean had been disabling critical 
warning and safety systems intended to detect gas leaks and prevent 
explosions, on the grounds that ‘false alarms’ would wake up 
workers.  Transocean also elected to bypass a key system on the 
blowout preventer control panel that might have prevented the 
explosion by cutting off spark sources once gas got in the drill stack.  
Five weeks before the disaster a Transocean engineer reported 
seeing damage to the blowout preventer, a critical piece of safety 
equipment that was the rig’s last line of defense against catastrophic 
failure.  Despite having made extensive representations to regulators 
about the critical safety role of blowout preventers in preventing 
major spills, BP apparently either did not know or did not care. 
On the day of the explosion, a negative pressure test—a test 
intended to make sure no gas or oil was seeping into the well—
indicated that the well was not properly sealed . . .  When the test 
was run for the fourth time, it [finally] registered the result the team 
had been looking for.  Rather than try to reconcile the contradictory 
information, the team accepted the last set of results and deemed the 
test satisfactory—a consequence, perhaps, of the fact that BP has no 
standard procedures for running the tests or for interpreting the 
results.  Hours later, hydrocarbons entered the well-bore, a gas leak 





106. See Bratspies, supra note 14, at 8.  
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The Regulatory Path to Tragedy 
The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling reports that on the day of the disaster, “regulators, [had] failed to 
keep pace with the industrial expansion and new technology—often because of 
industry’s resistance to more effective oversight.  The result was a serious, and 
ultimately inexcusable, shortfall in supervision of offshore drilling that played out 
in the Macondo well blowout.107 
 
What Have We Learned From Macondo? 
Following their investigation, The National Commission on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling issued a recommendations report 
with conclusions that included the following: 
 The explosive loss of the Macondo well could have been prevented. 
 The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be traced to a 
series of identifiable mistakes . . . that reveal such systematic failures in 
risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire 
industry. 
 Deepwater energy exploration and production, particularly at the 
frontiers of experience, involve risks for which neither industry nor 
government has been adequately prepared, but for which they can and 
must be prepared in the future . . . 
 Fundamental reform will be needed in both the structure of those in 
charge of regulatory oversight and their internal decision making process 
to ensure their political autonomy, technical expertise, and their full 
consideration of environmental protection concerns. 
 Because regulatory oversight alone will not be sufficient to ensure 
adequate safety, the oil and gas industry will need to take its own, 
unilateral steps to increase dramatically safety throughout the industry, 
including self-policing mechanisms that supplement governmental 
enforcement . . .108  When a failure happens at such depths, regaining 
control is a formidable engineering challenge—and the costs of failure, 
we now know, can be catastrophically high . . .109  There are recurring 
themes of missed warning signals, failure to share information, and a 
general lack of appreciation for the risks involved.  In the view of the 
Commission, these findings highlight the importance of organizational 
 
107. Deepwater, supra note 1, at xii. 
108. Deepwater Deep Water, supra note 1, at xii. 
109. Id. at ix. 
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culture and a consistent commitment to safety by industry, from the 
highest management levels on down.110 
 
During 2011, months after the release of the National Commission report, the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands (where the Transocean rig was registered) issued 
its report finding that “the rigs blowout resulted from the crew’s failure to react to 
multiple signs of trouble, but it stopped short of saying who was ultimately 
responsible for the incident.”111  Professor Bratspies contends that “BP knew, long 
before the Macondo well blew out on April 20, that it had no way to stop the leak.  
The company knew this when it elected not to conduct a cement bond log test… and 
when it chose the ‘cheap but risky’ method to case the well.”112  Significantly, 
Bratspies contends the company knew it couldn’t stop the leak when, on April 9, 
2010, BP, 
 
[C]laimed in written comments that its deep water drilling activities 
‘would not have an effect, cumulatively or individually, on the 
environment.’  Worst of all, BP knew this when it assured [the U.S. 
Minerals Management Service (MMS)] that: 
In the event of an unanticipated blowout resulting in 
an oil spill, it is unlikely to have an impact based on 
the industry wide standards for using proven 
equipment and technology for such responses, 
implementation of BP’s regional oil spill response 
plan which addresses [sic] available equipment and 
personnel, techniques for containment and recovery 
and removal of the oil spill.113 
 
Response to the Spill 
The response to the oil spill was also examined by the National Commission.  
In its published Recommendations, the Commission stated the following, 
 
There were remarkable instances of dedication and heroism by 
individuals involved in the rescue and cleanup.  Much was done 
well—and thanks to a combination of good luck and hard work, the 
worse-case scenarios did not all come to pass.   
But it is impossible to argue that the industry or the country was 
prepared for a disaster of the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon oil 
 
110. Id. 
111. Angel Gonzalez, New Gulf-Spill Report Points to Missed Signs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2011, 
at A3. 
112. See Bratspies, supra note 14, at 12. 
113. Id. 
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spill.  Twenty-one years after the Exxon Valdez Spill in Alaska, the 
same blunt response technologies—boom, dispersants, and 
skimmers—were used, to limited effect . . .  Both government and 
industry failed to anticipate and prevent this catastrophe, and failed 
again to be prepared to respond to it.  If we are to make future 
deepwater drilling safer and more environmentally responsible, we 
will need to address all these deficiencies together; a piecemeal 
approach will surely leave us vulnerable to future crises in the 
communities and natural environments most exposed to offshore 
energy exploration and production.114 
 
Need for Systematic Risk Assessment and Risk Management Tools 
Another observation made by The National Commission on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling that seems to be broadly 
applicable to many industries is that “systematic updating of the risk assessment and 
risk management tools used as the basis for regulation” appears to have been 
missing.115  Here, the regulator, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), 
 
Attempted under several administrations to promulgate regulations 
that would have required companies to manage all their activities 
and facilities, and those of their contractors, under a documented 
Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS).  But, in the 
face of industry opposition, MMS did not adopt such a requirement 
until September 2010, after the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster.  
Industry objections also derailed a past MMS proposal to expand 
data reporting requirements as a part of an effort to track and analyze 
offshore incidents and to identify safety trends and lagging and 
leading indicators.  The proposal was abandoned when the Office of 
Management and Budget agreed with industry complaints about 
compliance cost (industry also complained about the potential for 
overlap with Coast Guard reporting requirements).  As a result, there 
has historically been no legal requirement that industry track or 
report instances of uncontrolled hydrocarbon releases or “near 
misses”—both indicators that could point to a heightened potential 
for serious accidents.  The United States has the highest reported rate 
of fatalities in offshore oil and gas drilling among its international 
peers, but it has the lowest reporting of injuries.  This striking 
contrast suggests a significant under-reporting of injuries in the 
 
114. See Deepwater, supra note 1, at ix. 
115. Deepwater, supra note 1, at 3. 
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United States and highlights the need for better data collection to 
ensure needed attention to worker safety.116 
 
It seems that the lesson here is that construction and systematic updating of the risk 
assessment and risk management tools should not be just for regulatory purposes, 
but for ongoing management and board monitoring.  This appears fundamental to 
comport with best practices in enterprise risk assessment and monitoring. 
 
Lessons From Elsewhere Applied to Macondo 
The Commission observed that “while industry had devoted billions of 
dollars to the technologies required for deepwater drilling, it had devoted essentially 
nothing to creating alternative capabilities to deal with the foreseeable consequences 
of a disaster.”117  Given that drilling “the Macondo well under 5,000 feet of Gulf 
water and then over 13,000 feet under the sea floor to the hydrocarbon reservoir”118 
is an inherently risky endeavor, what can be learned elsewhere?  The Commission 
observed, 
 
Other inherently risky industries and endeavors (e.g. the United 
States Nuclear Navy, civilian nuclear power plant operators, and 
chemical manufacturers) have improved their safety culture and 
performance by creating self-policing organizations involved in 
standard-setting, auditing, exchanging best practices, training, 
ensuring accountability, and enforcement.  The experience from 
offshore drilling and production activities, and knowledge of 
geologic and ocean conditions outside the U.S., can provide insights 
into potential risks and the best practices for managing them 
effectively.119   
 
Accordingly, the Commission recommends that a new industry-run safety 
organization be created to work with government regulators, “to define best 
practices and police them, providing a mechanism for the leading companies to 
ensure the industry is not compromised by other enterprises with weaker safety 
standards and records.”120  The Commission’s vision is that “[t]he safety institute’s 
board, drawn from the top ranks of the industry, should develop both positive and 
negative incentives (rewards and sanctions) to help all companies operating offshore 
 
116. Id. 
117. Deepwater, supra note 1, at 3. 
118. Id. at viii. 
119. Id. at 12. 
120. Id. 
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overcome the natural enemies of safety: ignorance, arrogance, and complacency.”121  
Professor Joseph Karl Grant contends that 
 
There are times when corporate law and governance intersect with 
life, I love and savor these moments . . .  [F]rom the 2010 BP oil spill 
. . . we have many lessons to learn and apply to our own lives… 
From the BP oil spill I gleaned five (5) basic lessons . . .  First, if you 
lie, or are perceived to be lying, or make an inaccurate statement 
people will lose trust in you.  Second, we are not judged based on 
how we act in times of comfort, but based on how we react in times 
of crisis.  Third, the Emperor or King may be toppled.  Fourth, 
regulators and the regulated make for strange bedfellows—we must 
vigilantly guard against regulatory capture. Fifth, and finally, your 
Big Brother or Big Sister can and will twist your arm when he or she 
has a chance.122 
 
Regulatory Response: Accountability and Governance 
Regarding accountability, The Commission recommends that “[a]udit results 
should be used to hold companies accountable for their performance to each other 
and to certain business counterparts, including joint-venture partners; suppliers; 
insurers; and through assurances by the companies’ directors, and investors.”123  As 
to governance, the new industry-run safety organization “should be of, by, and for 
the private sector.  It will need to be created by the CEOs of leading companies and 
run by a director with unimpeachable integrity and a record of success in process 
safety that will be respected by its members and accepted by the public.”124 
 
But government depends upon the resources and expertise of private 
companies to contain a blown-out well and to respond to a massive 
oil spill.  Both the industry and government were woefully 
unprepared to contain or respond to Macondo: all parties lacked 
adequate contingency planning, and none had invested sufficiently 
in research and development to improve containment or response 
technology… it is clear that the oil and gas industry needs to develop 
large-scale rescue, response, and containment capabilities—
including equipment, procedures, and logistics—enabled by 
extensive training, including full-scale field exercises and 
 
121. Id. at 14. 
122. See Joseph Karl Grant, What Can We Learn from the 2010 BP Oil Spill?: Five Important 
Corporate Law and Life Lessons, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 809, 824 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1701892. 
123. Deepwater, supra note 1, at 15. 
124. Id. 
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international cooperation . . .  A future accident will, by definition, 
be unplanned and unexpected; containing its results will require the 
coordination of many complex activities going on simultaneously.125 
VI. GENERAL MOTORS IGNITION SWITCH CRISIS 
During 2014, it became apparent that General Motors had known about faulty 
ignition switches for years and engaged in an elaborate cover-up.  More than 100 
deaths were attributed to GM’s faulty ignition switch problem by the summer of 
2015.126  Manhattan U.S. Attorney’s Office head Preet Bharara believes that, 
 
[T]he auto industry, which had never previously faced federal 
criminal cases related to product defects, has long needed the threat 
of criminal liability to spur overdue changes.  ‘The first line of 
defense is self-policing within the company.  The second is 
regulators,’ Mr. Bharara said in a recent interview with the Wall 
Street Journal.  ‘When all those things have failed, prosecutors come 
along with the blunt hammer.  That does get some attention in the 
Board room.127 
 
One of America’s largest industrial giants, during 2014, GM’s worldwide sales 
reached 9.9 million vehicles, the largest estimated “market share in North America 
and South America, the number six market share in Europe and the number two 
market share in the Asia Pacific, Middle East and Africa region.”128  Prompted by 
the identification of at least 54 frontal-impact crashes, involving more than a dozen 
fatalities, the GM board of directors hired law firm Jenner & Block on March 10, 
2014, to find out the circumstances and why the Cobalt recall took so long to 
accomplish.129  The Valukas Report, written by former United States Attorney Anton 
R. Valukas, states that, 
 
125. Id. at 16. 
126. Christopher M. Matthews & Mike Spector, GM Likely to Face Criminal Charges, WALL ST. 
J., May 26, 2015 at B1.  See also Marianne Jennings & Lawrence J. Trautman, Ethical Culture and Legal 
Liability: The GM Switch Crisis and Lessons in Governance, 22 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 187 (2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2691536 (providing a comprehensive look at GM safety lapses during almost 60 
years).  
127. See Matthews & Spector, supra note 126.  See also Christopher M. Matthews & Mike Spector, 
U.S. Mulls Criminal Charges For GM, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2015 at A1. 
128. General Motors Company, Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended Dec. 31, 2014, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467858/000146785815000036/gm201410k.htm.  
129. Anton R. Valukas, Jenner & Block, Report to Board of Directors of General Motors Company 
Regarding Ignition Switch Recalls, 5 (May 29, 2014) , http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/05/ 
business/06gm-report-doc.html; see also Jeff Bennett, GM Report To Address Missteps, WALL ST. J., 
Jun. 2, 2014 at B1; Bill Vlasic, G.M. Inquiry Cites Years of Neglect Over Fatal Defect, N.Y. TIMES(June 
5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/06/business/gm-ignition-switch-internal-recall-investigation 
-report.html?_r=0.  
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GM personnel’s inability to address the ignition switch problem for 
over 11 years is a history of failures . . .  While GM heard over and 
over from various quarters—including customers, dealers, the press, 
and their own employees—that the car’s ignition switch led to 
moving stalls, group after group and committee after committee 
within GM that reviewed the issue failed to take action or acted too 
slowly.  Although everyone had responsibility to fix the problem, 
nobody took responsibility.130 
 
At Congressional hearings on the GM ignition switch crisis, Fred Upton, Chairman 
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce states that “[a] culture that 
allowed safety problems to fester for years will be hard to change.  But if GM is 
going to recover and regain the public’s trust, it must learn from this report and break 
the patterns that led to this unimaginable systemic breakdown.”131  Unlike a cultural 
environment that encouraged and rewarded employees for identifying problems and 
bringing them to the attention of management quickly, the GM work environment 
apparently offered “resistance or reluctance to raise issues or concerns.”132  
Congressman Tim Murphy states, 
 
Even when a good law . . . is in place it requires people to use 
common sense, value a moral code, and have a motivation driven by 
compassion for it to be effective.  Here the key people at GM seemed 
to lack all of these in a way that underscores that we cannot legislate 
common sense, mandate morality, nor litigate compassion.  At some 
point, it’s up to the culture of the company that has to go beyond 
paperwork and rules. 
The failures at GM were ones of accountability and culture.  
If employees do not have the moral fiber to do the right thing, and 
do not have the awareness to recognize when mistakes are being 




130. Valukas, supra note 129, at 2. 
131. The GM Ignition Switch Recall: Investigation Update: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, 113th Cong. (2014) (Opening Statement of the Honorable Fred Upton, 
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations), 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/the-gm-ignition-switch-recall-investigation-update. 
132. Valukas, supra note 129, at 252. 
133. The GM Ignition Switch Recall: Investigation Update: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, 113th Cong. (2014) (Opening Statement of the Honorable Tim Murphy, 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations), http://docs. 
house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20140618/102345/HHRG-113-IF02-20140618-SD004.pdf.  
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According to Professor Rena I. Steinzor, auto producers such as GM “have 
grown so complacent that they view billions of dollars in civil penalties and tort 
damages as unfortunate but routine costs of doing business . . . the legal system fails 
to instill the wariness in top executives that is essential . . . to make consumer safety 
their top priority.”134  Another risk you may not have contemplated in business or 
law school, Professor Steinzor cautions that “Federal prosecutors have started to 
think about launching criminal probes as soon as they learn about a grave 
malfeasance that threatens public health, kills consumers or workers, or damages 
natural resources.”135   
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced charges on September 17, 
2015 against General Motors of “concealing a potentially deadly safety defect from 
its U.S. regulator, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
from the Spring of 2012 through February 2014, and, in the process, misleading 
consumers concerning the safety of certain of GM’s cars.”136  In their announcement, 
DOJ states that “[r]ather than move swiftly and efficiently toward recall of at least 
the population of cars known to be affected by the safety defect . . . GM personnel 
took affirmative steps to keep the company’s internal investigation into airbag non-
deployment caused by the defective switch . . . outside of GM’s regular recall 
process.”137  Anthony Foxx, U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary, observed 
that GM “not only failed to disclose this deadly defect, but as the Department of 
Justice investigation shows, it actively concealed the truth from NHTSA and the 
public.”138  U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara of the Southern District of New York states, 
“[b]y doing so, GM put its customers and the driving public at serious risk.  Justice 
requires the filing of criminal charges, detailed admissions, a significant penalty, and 
the appointment of a federal monitor.  These measures are designed to make sure 
that this never happens again.”139  Special Inspector General Goldsmith Romero 
observes, “[t]he worst part about this tragedy is that it was entirely avoidable.  GM 
could have significantly reduced the risk of this deadly defect by improving the key 
design for less than one dollar per vehicle nut GM chose not to because of the 
cost.”140  Historically, this type of cost-based decisions was a part of GM’s culture.  
For example, with the Corvair of the 1960s, one of the fixes that was added too late 
for many were instructions inserted in the owner’s manual on the importance of 
proper rear-end tire inflation was well as guidance on steering in the event the rear 
 
134. See Rena I. Steinzor, (Still) ‘Unsafe at Any Speed’: Why Not Jail for Auto Executives?, 9 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 901, 904 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2616755. 
135. Id. at 927. 
136. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney of the Southern District of New York 
Announces Criminal Charges Against General Motors and Deferred Prosecution Agreement With $900 
Million Forfeiture (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-attorney-southern-district-new-
york-announces-criminal-charges-against-general-motors-and  (last viewed Mar. 5, 2016). 
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wheels of the Corvair happened to turn under due to under-inflation of those tires.141  
U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara announced that General Motors had entered into a 
deferred prosecution agreement “under which the company admits that it failed to 
disclose a safety defect to NHTSA and misled consumers . . .  The admissions are 
contained in a detailed statement of facts attached to the agreement.”142  The terms 
of the agreement require GM to “cooperate with the federal government and 
establish an independent monitor to review and assess the company’s policies and 
procedures in certain discrete areas relating to safety issues and recalls.”143  GM’s 
announcement also states, 
 
[T]hat the government’s decision to defer prosecution was based on 
the actions GM has taken to “demonstrate acceptance and 
acknowledgement of responsibility for its conduct, including: 
 Conducting a swift and robust internal investigation 
 Furnishing investigators with information and a continuous flow of 
unvarnished facts  
 Providing timely and meaningful cooperation more generally in the 
government’s investigation  
 Terminating wrongdoers 
 Establishing a full and independent victim compensation program 
that is expected to pay out more than $600 million in awards.144 
VII. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Conceptual Framework: Business Crisis & Continuity Management 
After scouring the crisis management literature, I am indebted to Professors 
Gregory L. Shaw and John R. Harrald, formerly of the Institute for Crisis, Disaster 
and Risk Management at the George Washington University for providing “a unique 
conceptual framework for visualizing, organizing and linking the myriad functional 
areas and functions inherent in an integrated enterprise-wide business crisis and 




141. See generally RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED, THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE 
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE 29 (1965).  
142. See Press Release, supra note 136. 
143. Press Release, General Motors Co., GM Reaches Agreement With U.S. Attorney’s Office 
(Sept. 17, 2015), http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2015 
/sep/0917-doj.html (last viewed June 7, 2017). 
144. Id. 
145. Greg L. Shaw & John R. Harrald, Identification of the Core Competencies Required of 
Executive Level Business Crisis and Continuity Managers, 1 J. HOMELAND SEC. & EMER. MGT. 4 (2004), 
citing John R. Harrald, A Strategic Framework for Corporate Crisis Management, Proceeds of the 
International Emergency Management Society (TIEMS) Conference, 389-397 (May 1998). 
TRAUTMAN MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2017  3:23 PM 
310 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:3 
Figure 1 




Drawing heavily from John R. Harrald’s [Figure 1] “Crisis Management and 
Business Continuity,”146 Shaw synthesized several frameworks [Figure 2] “into a 
single framework under which specific functional competencies were identified and 
analyzed.  This framework displays a functional hierarchy (from top to bottom) and 









146. See Shaw & Harrald, supra note 16, at 5. 
147. Id. 
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Figure 2 




I remain indebted to Professors Shaw and Harrald for their identification and 
grouping of business crisis and continuity management executive level 
competencies depicted as Figure 3, which provides “a prioritized inventory of 
competencies (knowledge, skills, abilities and/or attitudes) required for an executive 
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General Business Crisis and Continuity Management Competencies 
 
Enterprise Management/General BCCM 
1. Establish a consultative process with BCCM stakeholders. 
2. Determine local, state and federal laws and regulations with BCCM 
implications. 
3. Determine corporate governance requirements with BCCM implications. 
4. Establish and lead a multidisciplinary BCCM Steering Committee. 
5. Develop a business case for an overall BCCM program and supporting 
functions. 
6. Communicate top level management's acceptance and support of the 
BCCM program throughout the organization and to external 
stakeholders. 
7. Define a BCCM program structure that supports overall corporate, 
business unit, functional and program objectives. 
8. Establish policies and procedures that incorporate BCCM considerations 
into the management of all business operations (existing and 
developing). 
9. Define a measurement process and measures of effectiveness for the 
overall BCCM program and its component functional areas. 
10. Define a BCCM program maintenance process. 
11. Determine and specify the roles for internal and external (consultants) 
personnel in the BCCM program. 
12. Incorporate BCCM roles, accountabilities, responsibilities and authority 
into job/position descriptions. 
13. Incorporate BCCM responsibilities into the performance management 
and appraisal system. 
14. Establish a BCCM audit program. 
 
 
148. See Shaw & Harrald, supra note 16 (observing that “The resulting framework and prioritized 
competency inventory can assist organizations in structuring an enterprise wide business crisis and 
continuity management program to meet their specific requirements and provide guidelines for selection 
and professional development of organizational leaders with business crisis and continuity management 
responsibilities.”).  See also David J. Smith, Ed. Business Continuity Management: Good Practices 
Guidelines, Business Continuity Institute. London, England (2002), http://www.thebci.org.  
TRAUTMAN MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2017  3:23 PM 
Spring 2017] CRISIS GOVERNANCE 313 
VIII. WHEN CRISIS HITS 
Needed: Credible Threat Information 
A lesson learned by many who have managed their way through crisis is that 
initial situation information is almost always wrong.  For example, Texas-based 
petroleum refiner Valero has sustained crisis situations brought about by several 
major hurricanes.  James Pursell, Valero’s Director of Health, Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness states that “one of the few things you can almost always count on as 
being true is that initial situation reports are almost always wrong.149  Also subject 
to severe hurricane disruption is Texas-based grocer HEB.  Justen R. Noakes, HEB’s 
director of Emergency Preparedness reports encountering the same lack of initial 
trustworthy situation information as the crisis unfolds.150  Multiple information 
channels and sources will be necessary to develop useful information.  The Business 
Roundtable states that, 
 
The CEO is not typically in the business of gathering threat data.  
However, because of government classification rules and the 
structure of the U.S. intelligence community, security professionals 
will need to develop multiple relationships across federal and state 
governments to obtain such information.  Moreover, security 
directors may be forced to make assumptions based on available 
threat information, which is typically incomplete.  This process, 
although not an optimal system of information gathering, is 
dependent on support from senior principals.  Support may take 
many forms, from encouraging relationships with new federal 
entities to recognizing the limitations of intelligence gathering as 
part of security decision making.151 
 
The Challenge of Crisis Leadership 
Professors Erika Hayes James and Lynn Perry Wooten report that “[m]any 
organizational leaders have a laissez faire attitude toward the possibility of a crisis 
happening in their firm, despite the high probability that every business leader and 
 
149. See James Pursell, Dir. Health, Safety & Emergency Prep., Valero Corporation, Crisis 
Management and Adversity: Opportunities for Organizational Development and Learning, Remarks 
before Annual Academy of Management Meeting (Aug. 14, 2011). 
150. See Justen R. Nokes, Dir. Of Emergency Preparedness, HEB, Crisis Management and 
Adversity: Opportunities for Organizational Development and Learning, Remarks before Annual 
Academy of Management Meeting (Aug. 14, 2011). 
151. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 35. 
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every organization will experience a crisis of some significance.”152  As a result, 
“leaders are underprepared not only for ‘managing’ crisis situations when they 
occur, but also—and more important—for leading organizations in turbulent times 
with a vision or expectation that they and their organizations can be positively 
transformed by the experience.”153  James and Wooten stress that “it is often the 
(mis)handling of crisis, not the crisis itself, that can have the most severe 
consequences, positive and negative for a firm.”154  A recent survey conducted by 
crisis communication experts Levick Communications and lawyers Pillsbury 
Winthrop discovered that “though 60 percent of survey respondents said their 
companies have a crisis plan in place, just 29 percent felt very confident their 
organization would respond effectively if a crisis occurred.  Another 56 percent said 
they felt somewhat confident.”155  Tom Campbell, head of Pillsbury’s Crisis 
management team, observes that “even among those companies which have 
developed a crisis plan, 63% report that their company does NOT conduct annual 
training drills or exercises to test the effectiveness of their plan and ensure that all 
company employees know what to do if a crisis does occur.”156  Moreover, 
 
Even more strikingly, fully one-third of those companies which do 
have a crisis plan could not recall the last time they actually reviewed 
or revised it, which clearly indicates an out-of-sight/out-of-mind 
approach to crisis management that may prove a company’s undoing 
. . .  Among the survey’s key findings:  
 In the past three years, 42% of respondents said their 
company was the subject of a government inquiry or 
investigation, which can set up off alarm bells for 
shareholders, investors, customers and employees alike.  24% 
of respondents claim that their company had faced a natural 
disaster and an equal number of respondents said their 
company had experienced a data loss or security breach.  21% 
of all companies had experienced at least one worker accident 
or death, while nine percent reported being the target of 
protesters or a consumer boycott.  Significantly, many survey 
participants experienced multiple crises over the past three 
years… 
 
152. Erika Hayes James & Lynn Perry Wooten, Leadership in Turbulent Times: Competencies for 
Thriving Amidst Crisis, 2 (Darden Business School, Working Paper No. 04-04, 2004), http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=555966. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 3. 
155. Press Release, PillsburyWinthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, Just 29% of Corporate Executives 
Confident of Weathering A Crisis Says Survey (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/index. 
cfm?pageid=19&itemid=5700.  
156. Id. 
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 Following a crisis, 79% of survey respond[ents] said their 
companies made minor or major changes to their crisis 
protocol to make it more effective.  Among the most popular 
improvements were additional training (21%) and conducting 
a crisis audit (18%) followed by strengthened General 
Counsel oversight, purchased or upgraded business 
interruption/liability insurance, moved crucial systems off-
site, or upgraded technology security systems, all of which 
scored 14%.  Several companies implemented more than one 
of these improvements.157 
 
“What differentiates those firms that thrive following a crisis from those that do not 
is the leadership displayed throughout the process.”158  Advance preparation is 
essential, since 
 
During a crisis, CEO leadership may be needed on several levels.  
Employees may require one kind of support and guidance, while 
shareholders and investors may look to the CEO for other types of 
leadership.  Failure to consider human resources needs in advance 
can impede a corporation’s recovery in the event of a disaster.159  
 
James and Wooten contend there is “a difference between crisis management and 
crisis leadership, and that what differentiates firms that thrive following a crisis from 
those that do not is the leadership displayed throughout the crisis management 
process.”160  Based upon years of previous research, James and Wooten introduce a 
framework of six crisis competencies extending, 
 
[B]eyond managing corporate communication to highlighting the 
notion that the best crisis leaders are those who build a foundation 
of trust not only within their organization, but also throughout the 
supply chain.  These leaders then use that foundation to prepare their 
organizations for difficult times, to contain crises when they occur, 
and to leverage crisis situations as a means for creating change and, 
ultimately, a better organization.161 
 
 
157. Press Release, supra note 155. 
158. See James & Wooten, supra note 152, at 3. 
159. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 68. 
160. See James & Wooten, supra note 152, at 2. 
161. Id. 
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The Disaster Constituencies 
The corporate crisis will inevitably create several groups of diverse 
constituencies: customers, affected communities, employees, governmental 
regulatory authorities, investors, media, and public opinion.  Each of these discrete 
constituencies will demand immediate attention and likely become increasingly 
hostile as time passes.  Customers will reconsider their loyalty to your products and 
services and may require reasonable assurances that you can perform to meet your 
contractual obligations or usual production levels.  The community affected by your 
crisis will want assurances that you will be able to meet your obligations in a timely 
manner and with least negative impact (the Union Carbide Bopahl chemical disaster 
and BP oil spill damage to the Gulf of Mexico coastal beaches and estuaries comes 
to mind).  During a corporate crisis, all employees will be concerned about how this 
will impact their personal future.  Government regulatory authorities will be 
demanding answers and triggering investigations of their own in many cases (this 
may include separate or multiple municipal, state and federal regulatory agencies).  
Investors will demand prompt answers upon penalty of selling their positions and 
timely regulatory disclosures will be necessary.  The care and feeding of media 
requires special skills and experience to minimize damage to corporate reputation.  
Public opinion for years to come may depend upon how well you have planned. 
 
The Crisis Plan and Team 
Crisis expert Laurence Barton observes that “some managers shine in a crisis, 
while others stumble.  The difference between the two is often defined by 
preparedness, candor, rehearsal, and anticipation of the needs of stakeholders . . . 
having a crisis plan is likely to increase both the quality of your responsiveness and 
your stakeholders’ perception of you.”162  The Business Roundtable notes that 
“security incidents nearly always involve complicated transportation challenges.  
Corporations should consider strategies for identifying, locating and transporting 
key employees to critical locations under circumstances when the usual modes of 
transportation may be unavailable.163 
According to crisis communications experts Levick Communications, the 
seamless crisis management team should “draw on all the knowledge of the CFO, 
the marketing experts, investor relations, and lawyers.  Their expertise must be 
provided to the corporate crisis communicators in publicly digestible and credible 
formats for public consumption.  The public is always the end-user in business crisis 
management.”164  In addition, 
 
162. Laurence Barton, CRISIS LEADERSHIP NOW: A REAL-WORLD GUIDE TO PREPARING FOR 
THREATS, DISASTER, SABOTAGE, AND SCANDAL 8 (2008). 
163. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 71. 
164. PillsburyWinthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, Communication Tools: Crisis Management, 
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/crisis-management-resource-center (last viewed June 7, 2017). 
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Crisis management presents an almost impossible task for many 
businesses, which is to respond fast enough to a sudden situation 
before it spins out of control while simultaneously anticipating 
future situations.  The solution is to maintain constant dialogue 
among the diverse team members, drawing on their diverse skills 
and backgrounds.  Crisis management moves forward in the same 
way that technology moves forward, with new tools discovered and 
applied every day.  Business crisis management initiatives shouldn’t 
stop moving simply because there’s no immediate crisis at hand.165 
 
Time is “of the Essence” 
Crisis situations do not provide adequate time to pull together a committee to 
begin discussions about what needs to be done.  The Business Roundtable recognizes 
that “[l]eadership on the part of corporate executives is key to making employees 
feel safe in the event of a disaster.  Coming out early with appropriate information 
can prevent panic among both company employees and the public in the affected 
community.”166  In addition, “[h]uman resources officials should make certain that 
their crisis management, business continuity and disaster recovery plans will enable 
the company to weather the immediate emergency and recover smoothly 
afterward.”167  Moreover, 
 
Given how rapidly workforce issues can escalate during a crisis, 
human resource managers need to be fully integrated into strategic 
planning to enable the company to respond immediately.  As 
terrorist threats increase in severity, new, more robust plans may be 
needed to shepherd a company’s workforce through a potential 
disaster.  Corporate officers in charge of human resources and 
security should consider strategies to attend to the health, welfare 
and safety of employees before, during and after a crisis.168 
 
Role of Effective Communications 
 
Internal communications will be critical in times of crisis to provide 
situational awareness as to what has happened and the extent of actual and potential 
damage to employees and enterprise constituencies.  Understanding the facts as 
quickly as possible is imperative to making intelligent decisions.  Effective 
communications will be necessary to determine “[w]hat is the situation in the various 
 
165. Id. 
166. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 65. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 70. 
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locations affected by the emergency? How are employees reacting?  What kinds of 
information and resources are needed to deal with the immediate emergency?  
Corporate officials should formulate emergency plans, train employees and carry 
out drills.”169  In particular, “[h]uman resources officials should empower employees 
so they will know where to go, what to do, and whom to contact during and after a 
disaster.  It is important to give employees permission to do what they want to do, 
including contacting their family members and helping one another.”170 
 
Professional Communications Resources 
Communicating with outside constituencies, the press, shareholders, 
government agencies (federal, state and local—for every location impacted), 
vendors, families of your employees, and so on, is also important.   Thus, having 
professional public relations communications resources in place before a crisis is 
paramount.  Levick notes, “[p]ublic relations crisis communications are as varied as 
the stakes themselves.  It may mean a reputation is on the line.  It may mean there’s 
a lawsuit that must be won, and public perception is a key factor in the outcome.  
Stock values may be at risk.”171  Moreover, 
 
The art of public relations crisis communication (Crisis PR) 
demands that you know who your audiences are and how they can 
be most effectively reached.  Is there a Congressman whose support 
is crucial during a crisis?  If so, the local newspaper in his or her 
district, in Iowa or Kentucky or Arizona, may be more important 
than the Washington Post or New York Times.  PR crisis 
communication at its best demands veteran practitioners with the 
instincts and the training to finesse such myriad media venues…  
Public relations crisis communication begins with personal 
relationships – with reporters, editors, broadcasters – but is 
leveraged through technology planning and grassroots 
campaigning.172 
 
The questions to be asked include, “[a]re there independent outside parties who can 
credibly advance your cause?  What is the role of online forums?  Are there “events” 
that can be staged—public demonstrations, perhaps, or town meetings that will rally 
support for your cause or demonstrate momentum in your favor?”173 
 
 
169. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 66. 
170. Id. 
171. PillsburyWinthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, supra note 164. 
172. Id. 
173. PillsburyWinthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, supra note 164. 
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Disaster Scenario Practice Pays Dividends 
 
Crisis scenario testing and training is credited with providing insightful data 
about program strengths and weaknesses.  After the trauma of September 11, 2001, 
the financial services industry “initiated a significant review of lessons learned with 
a view towards strengthening their business continuity plans.  The agencies believe 
that it is important for financial firms to improve recovery capabilities to address the 
continuing, serious risks to the U.S. financial system posed by the post-September 
11 environment.”174  Many industry participants “agree that routine use or testing of 
back-up facilities is necessary and beneficial to ensure financial system viability.  
They also suggest that testing should be ‘end-to-end’ involving telecommunication 
firms, third-party service providers, and securities exchanges.”175  The Business 
Roundtable believes, 
The CEO must be willing to participate directly in crisis tests and 
training scenarios.  Some companies, for example, take one day out 
of the year to challenge the CEO on responses to potential “corporate 
killer” issues.  Direct CEO involvement in business continuity and 
disaster recovery programs is needed to heighten the level of 
awareness among employees.  Having senior corporate officers 
participate in mock disaster scenarios and evacuation drills, for 
example, communicates the importance of these drills to the 
workforce, outside contractors, and others at the facility.  The 
experience also may highlight how the CEO should alter or create 
governance and management teams.176 
IX. WHAT IF MANAGEMENT IS IMPLICATED? 
 
Every board will be well-advised to establish a special committee of the board 
and perhaps hire special counsel whenever it is confronted with a factual situation 
where management may eventually be found culpable of wrongdoing or even failure 
to anticipate and provide planning for contingencies in the event of a foreseeable 
natural disaster.  During my research and writing of this article, I circulated early 
drafts to experts for comment.  One of the most helpful responses I received was 
from MIT engineering professor Nancy Leveson, when she observes, 
 
Management is ALWAYS implicated in major accidents. I have 
been doing safety engineering for 35 years and have investigated and 
read about hundreds of accidents. In every one, management has 
some responsibility for the events. In some they managed to not be 
 
174. Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial 
System, SEC Release No. 34-47638 (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/34-47638.htm. 
175. Id. 
176. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 87. 
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"implicated" but that is usually due to very poor investigation efforts 
or efforts by management to hide their guilt.177 
 
The Institute for Crisis Management reports that “Executives and Managers are 
responsible for at least half of all crises, on average, while employees are credited 
with causing 32% and outside forces triggered the remaining 18% on average, during 
the past ten years.”178  
Accounting irregularities will almost always result in a situation where a 
board will be well-advised to form a special committee, independent of 
management, to investigate.  Recent examples of a corporate crisis where 
management must sustain scrutiny include the 2011 revelations of alleged illegal 
payments to government officials and telephone hacking by Newscorp 
International.179 
 
Special Committee of the Board 
 
Professors Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and Edward B. Rock observe that “[o]ver 
the last thirty years, the independent directors have occasionally been represented 
by independent counsel.  Instances include: special litigation committees reviewing 
derivative suits; independent committees in parent subsidiary mergers and MBOs; 
and internal investigations of misconduct.”180  Professor James D. Cox states, 
“[c]onflicts of interest transactions are ubiquitous within today’s corporate 
environment.  Executives need to be paid, directors receive compensation for their 
board service and there frequently are transactions within the corporation’s 
dominant stockholder, to name just a few of the events that regularly pose conflicts 
of interest issues.”181  In addition, the board’s special litigation committee “is a 
subcommittee . . . that has the power to intercede in shareholder derivative claims 
brought against other members of the board.  It has the authority to decide whether 
 
177. E-mail from Professor Nancy Leveson, Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering 
Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to Lawrence J. Trautman (June 27, 2015, 15:59 CST) 
(on file with author).  
178. Annual ICM Crisis Report 2010, Institute for Crisis Management (May 2011), http:// 
www.crisisexperts.com/. 
179. Alistar MacDonald, Cassell Bryan-Low & Paul Sonne, Ex-Cameron Aide Arrested in Hacking 
Case, WALL ST. J., Jul. 9, 2011, at A9; John Bussey, The Missteps in Managing News Corp.’s Hacking 
Crisis, WALL ST. J., Jul. 21, 2011, at B1; Cassell Bryan-Low, Paul Sonne & Steve Stecklow, Hacking 
Testimony Is Disputed, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2011, at A1.  See also Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. 
Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and Officers' Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 
66 AM. U. L. REV. (2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2883607. 
180. Geoffrey C. Hazard & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The Emergence of 
the Independent Directors’ Counsel (U. Penn. Inst. For Law & Econ., Research Paper 04-07, 2004), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=519242.  
181. James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside 
Directors With Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077 (2003). 
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the derivative claims should be pursued, settled, or dismissed, but its decision is 
never believed to be in doubt.”182  
On July 21, 2002, a Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors 
of WorldCom, Inc. was created.  The members of the Special Committee were new 
to the Board of WorldCom, and neither the committee members nor their “counsel 
had any relationship with WorldCom or its personnel during the period when the 
events under investigation occurred.”183  Worldcom Special Committee member 
Dennis R. Beresford recalls, 
 
In the WorldCom situation, the Board selected the same law firm 
that had done the Enron special investigation. While I was not on the 
board at that time, I understand the decision was made based on the 
belief that the law firm would be experienced in dealing with a 
massive fraud and would "hit the ground running." Also, the 
WorldCom investigation by the law firm was led by former SEC 
head of enforcement Bill McLucas and it was felt that his experience 
would be helpful in both doing the investigation and in gaining SEC 
acceptance of the findings. Based on his work at Enron, Bill urged 
the WorldCom board to bring in new directors to oversee the 
investigation as he felt the Enron investigation was "tainted" a bit by 
having it overseen by current directors. In other words, as directors 
of WorldCom would be one of the presumed targets of the 
investigation, it was believed that having new directors oversee it 
would give much more credibility.184 
 
The Special Committee was directed by the WorldCom board to “conduct a full and 
independent investigation of the accounting irregularities that gave rise to the 
announced intention to restate, and such other matters as [the Special Committee] 
concluded should be considered without any limitations.”185  By way of summary, 
the Special Committee concluded, 
 
From 1999 until 2002, WorldCom suffered one of the largest public 
company accounting frauds in history.  As enormous as the fraud 
 
182. Minor Myers, The Decisions of Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An Empirical 
Investigation (Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 112, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1162858, citing WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 209 (9th ed. 2004).  See also Karen Brenner, Corporate Investigations 
- Challenges in Corporate Governance (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1684238.  
183. WorldCom, Inc. REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE 
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. (Mar. 31, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/723527/000093176303001862/dex991.htm.  
184. See E-mail from Dennis R. Beresford, former Worldcom Special Committee member, to 
Lawrence J. Trautman (July 1, 2015, 10:43 CST) (on file with author). 
185. See WorldCom, Inc. REPORT, supra note 183 at 2. 
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was, it was accomplished in a relatively mundane way: more than 
$9 billion in false or unsupported accounting entries were made in 
WorldCom’s financial systems in order to achieve desired reported 
financial results.  The fraud did not involve WorldCom’s network, 
its technology, or its engineering.  Most of WorldCom’s people did 
not know it was occurring. Rather, the fraud occurred as a result of 
knowing misconduct directed by a few senior executives centered in 
its Clinton, Mississippi headquarters, and implemented by personnel 
in its financial and accounting departments in several locations.  The 
fraud was the consequence of the way WorldCom’s Chief Executive 
Officer, Bernard J. Ebbers, ran the Company. Though much of this 
Report details the implementation of the fraud by others, he was the 
source of the culture, as well as much of the pressure, that gave birth 
to this fraud. That the fraud continued as long as it did was due to a 
lack of courage to blow the whistle on the part of others in 
WorldCom’s financial and accounting departments; inadequate 
audits by Arthur Andersen; and a financial system whose controls 
were sorely deficient. The setting in which it occurred was marked 
by a serious corporate governance failure. 
On June 25, 2002, WorldCom announced that it intended to 
restate its financial statements for 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. 
It stated that it had determined that certain transfers totaling $3.852 
billion during that period from “line cost” expenses (costs of 
transmitting calls) to asset accounts were not made in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). Less than 
one month later, WorldCom and substantially all of its active U.S. 
subsidiaries filed voluntary petitions for reorganization under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. WorldCom subsequently 
announced that it had discovered an additional $3.831 billion in 
improperly reported earnings before taxes for 1999, 2000, 2001 and 
first quarter 2002. It has also written off approximately $80 billion 
of the stated book value of the assets on the Company’s balance 
sheet at the time the fraud was announced.186 
 
Another example of a special board committee created to investigate a 
corporate crisis is illustrated by the Enron board’s Special Investigative 
Committee, chaired by then University of Texas Law School Dean William 
C. Powers, Jr.187  The Enron Special Committee was,  
 
186. Id. at 1. 
187. See generally William C. Powers, Jr., Chair Raymond S. Troubh Herbert S. Winokur, Jr., 
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
OF ENRON CORP. (Feb. 1, 2002), http://news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/enron/sicreport/.  
TRAUTMAN MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2017  3:23 PM 
Spring 2017] CRISIS GOVERNANCE 323 
[E]stablished on October 28, 2001, to conduct an investigation of the related-
party transactions . . . [which included] examin[ing] the specific transactions 
that led to the third-quarter 2001 earnings charge and the restatement . . . [and] 
attempt[ing] to examine . . . two dozen other transactions between Enron and 
these related-party entities: what these transactions were, why they took 
place, what went wrong, and who was responsible.188  
 
Emergence of Special Counsel 
 
Hazard and Rock predict that a new permanent role has emerged in the board 
room: that of Counsel to the Independent Directors.189  Accordingly, “with the 
additional legal requirement imposed on independent directors by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and related changes to SEC rules and Stock Exchange listing 
requirements, the independent directors, especially those on the Audit Committee, 
will begin to be represented on a continuing basis by independent legal counsel.”190 
 
When a company launches an internal investigation in the wake of a 
scandal, the credibility of the investigation depends in no small 
measure on the perception that the law firm conducting the 
investigation is independent of the potential wrong doers.  To take 
but one example, when Enron launched an investigation of 
accounting irregularities, it appointed a special committee of 
directors, who in turn retained special outside legal counsel, which 
was largely (although not totally) independent of Enron.191 
 
A good example of notable uses of special counsel during a corporate crisis, is found 
in my previous discussion of General Motors retaining noted attorney Anton R. 
Valukas to conduct a special independent investigation and issue a report about the 





189. See Hazard & Rock, supra note 180.  
190. Id. 
191. Id., citing William Powers Report to the Board of Directors of the Enron Corporation, 
February 1, 2002, http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102rpt1.pdf).   
192. See Anton R. Valukas, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY 
REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS, (May 29, 2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud. 
org/documents/1183508/g-m-internal-investigation-report.pdf (last viewed June 7, 2017). 
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Workplace safety has developed new meaning following the September 11th 
2001 World Trade Center attack.  The Business Roundtable states, “A corporation 
needs to have plans in place for what to do if yellow police tape is draped around a 
key building, if mass evacuations are ordered following a disaster, or if key 
employees have been harmed or cannot reach a critical worksite.”193 
 
Previously, when security primarily called for controlling perimeter 
access, risk issues did not rise high enough to require the CEO or 
board of directors to analyze them fully.  But in the current risk 
climate, threats can materialize so quickly and cause so much 
potential damage to a corporation’s operating capability that CEOs 





Few operational areas of every corporation present as much inherent risk or 
prove as difficult to govern as Information Technology ("IT") and novel 
technological advances in the way business is conducted.195  A reasonable question 
voiced from many boardrooms is “[h]ow can I be expected to govern something I 
 
193. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8, at 4. 
194. Id. at 66. 
195. See generally Deven R. Desai, Beyond Location: Data Security in the 21st Century, 56 
Communications of the ACM, (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2237712; Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's 
Scope: Interpreting ‘Access’ and ‘Authorization’ in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 
(2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=399740; Juliet M. Moringiello, Warranting Data Security, 5 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COMM. L. (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1710761; Peter Swire, A Theory of Disclosure 
for Security and Competitive Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Agencies, 
42 HOUS. L. REV. (2006),  http://ssrn.com/abstract=842228; Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, 
Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522605; Lawrence J. Trautman, James C. Wetherbe & Jason 
Triche, Corporate Information Governance Under Fire, 8 J. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 105 (2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2314119; Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated 
Payment Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041 (2017), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=2730983; Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of 
Financial Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 232 (2016), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2786186; Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty 
Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 13 (2014), available at http://www.ssrn.com/ab 
stract=2393537; Rachel Wellhausen, Multinational Corporations, Nationality, and Government Breach 
of Contract, APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper; MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 
2011-15 (2011),  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1900202.  
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know so little about?”196  However, recent years have brought a growing realization 
that not knowing is not an excuse.  As more and more responsibility is placed on 
boards to oversee all areas of risk their companies face, there is a critical need to 
provide effective governance over information technology, along with the necessary 
leadership from the top, organizational structures, and processes that ensure that 
Information Technology efficiently sustains and extends the corporate strategies and 
objectives. 
All too often the reality of IT performance and enterprise risk exposure 
conflicts with boardroom expectations.  Common examples of undesired IT results 
include “business losses, reputational damage and a weakened competitive position; 
inability to obtain or measure a return from IT investments; failure of IT initiatives 
to bring the innovation and benefits they promised; technology that is inadequate or 
even obsolete; inability to leverage available new technologies; and deadlines that 
are not met and budgets that are overrun.”197 
IT risks are inherent in a company’s operations, including, for example, risks 
to third parties in operations, such as the inadvertent disclosure of sensitive customer 
data either by the company itself or third parties; theft of data by cybercriminals; or 
exposure of your customers to viruses from hackers.  IT risks also include direct 
risks to a company such as the infiltration of viruses in internal systems, business 
interruption due to security breaches or viruses, the costs of restoring damaged or 
lost data, or the costs of notifying customers when their data has been 
compromised.198 
In their 2011 journal article, The Board’s Responsibility for Information 
Technology Governance, Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price report, 
 
After a theft by cybercriminals of 130 million credit and debit card 
numbers, a securities fraud class action was filed against Heartland 
Payment Systems for “fraudulently misrepresent[ing] the general 
state of its data security” and concealing an earlier cyber-attack 
during earnings calls and in SEC filings.  It was believed at the time 
 
196. Peter Weill and Jeanne W. Ross depict Information Technology as one of the “six key assets 
for any enterprise" (the others being human, physical, financial, intellectual property and relationships).  
See PETER WEILL & JEANNE W. ROSS, IT GOVERNANCE: HOW TOP PERFORMERS MANAGE IT DECISIONS 
RIGHTS FOR SUPERIOR RESULTS 6 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Press) (2004).  Peter Weill, Director of the Center for 
Information Systems Research (“CISR”) and Senior Research Scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology's Sloan School of Management led research during 2001-2003 which studied 256 enterprises 
in Europe, Asia Pacific and the Americas.  During the same general time period, parallel studies were 
conducted by Jeanne Ross and Cynthia Beath (University of Texas), cited in Lawrence J. Trautman & 
Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s responsibility for Information Technology Governance, 29 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313 (2011). 
197. See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 22 at 314, citing Board Briefing on IT 
Governance, 2d ed., IT Governance Institute, 8 (2003). 
198. See Urs Gasser, Jonathan Zittrain, Robert Faris, Rebekah Heacock Jones, Internet Monitor 
2014: Reflections on the Digital World: Platforms, Policy, Privacy, and Public Discourse Berkman Center 
Research Publication No. 2014-17 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538813. 
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to be the largest security breach ever.  Although the breach occurred 
over the course of 2008, the company did not discover it until 
January 2009.   When Heartland disclosed the breach, the stock price 
dropped almost 80%; it was virtually inevitable that shareholders 
would sue.  It was ultimately revealed that the breach was caused by 
a piece of “malicious software planted on the company's payment 
processing network that recorded payment card data as it was being 
sent for processing to Heartland by thousands of the company's retail 
clients.” Heartland did not know “how long the malicious software 
was in place, how it got there or how many accounts may have been 
compromised.”  What Heartland did know is that the stolen data 
included names, credit and debit card numbers, and expiration dates. 
While the shareholder class action against Heartland was later 
dismissed for failure under the PSLRA to plead fraud with 
particularity, the company and its officers and directors were forced 
to pay $60 million in a settlement with Visa, $41.4 million in a 
settlement with MasterCard, $3.6 million in a settlement with 
American Express, up to $2.4 million in a consumer cardholder class 
action over the same breach, as well as the defense costs of the 
dismissed suit and internal investigation costs incurred by the 
company.199 
 
Cyber risk has proven costly for many years now.  In his July 28, 2010 Statement 
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security, FBI Assistant Director Gordon M. Snow observed, “[c]yber thieves use 
data mining on social networking sites as a way to extract sensitive information. This 
can be done by criminal actors on either a large or small scale . . .  The impact . . . 
can be substantial . . . with the consequences ranging from a mere inconvenience to 
financial ruin.”200  Moreover, 
 
These criminals are increasingly professionalized, organized, and 
have unique or specialized skills.  In addition, cyber crime is 
increasingly transnational in nature, with individuals living in 
different countries around the world working together on the same 
schemes. In late 2008, an international hacking ring carried out one 
of the most complicated and organized computer fraud attacks ever 
conducted. The crime group used sophisticated hacking techniques 
to compromise the encryption used to protect data on 44 payroll 
debit cards, and then provided a network of “cashers” to withdraw 
 
199. See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 22 at 333. 
200. The FBI’s Efforts to Combat Cyber Crime as it Relates to Social Networking Sites, Before the 
H. Judiciary Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, (July 28, 2010) (statement of 
Gordon M. Snow, Asst. Dir., Cyber Div, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
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more than $9 million from over 2,100 ATMs in at least 280 cities 
worldwide, including cities in the United States, Russia, Ukraine, 
Estonia, Italy, Hong Kong, Japan and Canada. The $9 million loss 
occurred within a span of less than 12 hours. The cyber underground 
facilitates the exchange of cyber crime services, tools, expertise, and 
resources, which enables this sort of transnational criminal operation 
to take place across multiple countries.201 
 
Trautman also reports that “costs attributable to cybersecurity losses vary 
dramatically, according to one 2013 survey the “average annualized cost of cyber-
crime to a sample of U.S. companies was $11.6 million per year, representing a 78% 
increase since 2009.”202  IBM Cybersecurity Counsel Andrew H. Tannenbaum 
warns about the continued loss of U.S. industry’s most valuable intellectual property 
having “been stolen in milliseconds.”203  Senator Joseph Lieberman states that 
“Extremely valuable intellectual property is being stolen regularly by cyber 
exploitation, by people and individuals and groups and countries abroad . . .  This 
means jobs are being created abroad that would otherwise be created here.”204  Sarah 
Bloom Raskin, Deputy Treasury Secretary, reports that “what we can be sure of is 
that the financial costs are real and increasing; they stem from the disruption of 
business, erosion of customers, and the associated loss of revenue, from expenses 
incurred to secure systems, and appropriately notify customers.”205 
 
 
201. The FBI’s Efforts to Combat Cyber Crime as it Relates to Social Networking Sites, Before the 
H. Judiciary Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, (July 28, 2010) (statement of 
Gordon M. Snow, Asst. Dir., Cyber Div, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
202. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy, 2015 J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 
341, 356 (2015), citing Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Boards 
of Directors, Corporate Governance and Cyber Risks: Sharpening the Focus, Address Before the New 
York Stock Exchange, Conference on “Cyber Risks and the Boardroom” (June 10, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542057946#.U6t-wvldWHg., citing HP Press 
Release, HP Reveals Cost of Cybercrime Escalates 70 Percent, Time to Resolve Attacks More Than 
Doubles (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-release.html?id=1501128. 
203. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy, 2015 J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 
341, 356 (2015), citing The Growing Cyber Threat and its Impact on American Business: Hearings Before 
the H. Perm. Select Comm. Intelligence, 114th Cong. 1 (2015) (statement of Andrew H. Tannenbaum, 
Cybersecurity Counsel, IBM), http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/docu 
ments/TannenbaumSFR03192015.pdf.  
204. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy, 2015 J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 
341, 356 (2015), citing Joseph Lieberman, Securing America’s Future: The Cybersecurity Act of 2012: 
Hearing Before the Comm. On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. (Feb. 16, 
2012) (Opening Statement of Chairman Joseph Lieberman), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/ 
securing-americas-future-the-cybersecurity-act-of-2012.  
205. See Sarah Bloom Raskin, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, Remarks 
Before the Meeting of the Texas Bankers’ Association Executive Leadership Cybersecurity Conference: 
Cybersecurity for Banks: 10 Questions for Executives and Their Boards (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www. 
treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9711.aspx. (last viewed Mar. 5, 2016). 
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Target Breach 
Major U.S. retailer Target Corporation sells “a wide assortment of general 
merchandise and food through . . . store and digital channels . . .  At January 31, 
2015, [Target] employed approximately 347,000 full-time, part-time and seasonal 
employees . . .  During the sales period from Thanksgiving to the end of December 
[2014] . . . employment levels peaked at approximately 447,000.”206 
Target experienced a data breach during the fourth quarter of 2013, when “an 
intruder stole certain payment card and other [customer] information from [their] 
data network (the Data Breach) . . .  As of January 31, 2015 [Target has] incurred 
$252 million of cumulative Data Breach-related expenses, partially offset by $90 
million of expected insurance recoveries, for net cumulative expenses of $162 
million.”207  As of the same date, Target disclosed that “more than 100 legal “actions 
have been filed in courts in many states, along with one action in Canada, and other 
claims have been or may be asserted . . . on behalf of [customers], payment card 
issuing banks, shareholders or others seeking damages.”208  The Congressional 
Research Service reports that back-of-the-envelope estimates made by independent 
sources range “from $240 million to $2.2 billion in fraudulent charges alone.  This 
does not include additional potential costs to consumers concerned about their 
personal information or credit histories, potential fines or penalties to Target, 
financial institutions, or others; or any costs to Target related to loss of consumer 
confidence.”209  According to testimony provided by Target executive vice president 
and chief financial officer John J. Mulligan, the chronology of the breach is as 
follows: 
 November 12, 2013—intruders breached Target’s computer system. 
The intrusion was detected by Target’s security systems, but the 
company’s security professionals took no action until notified by law 
enforcement of the breach.  
 December 12, 2013—the Department of Justice (DOJ) notified Target 
that there was suspicious activity involving payment cards that had 
been used at Target.  
 December 13, 2013—Target met with DOJ and the U.S. Secret 
Service.  
 December 14, 2013—Target hired outside experts to conduct a 
thorough forensic investigation.  
 
206. Target Corporation, Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended Jan. 31, 2015, 2, 3 (2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/27419/000002741915000012/tgt-20150131x10k.htm#s2AC2 
22A90C0DF88C3C65A5EBB013D478. 
207. Supra at 17 to financial statements. 
208. Id. 
209. See N. Eric Weiss & Rena S. Miller, The Target and Other Financial Data Breaches: 
Frequently Asked Questions, Congressional Research Service Report, 2 (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.fas. 
org/sgp/crs/misc/R43496.pdf (last viewed Mar. 5, 2016). 
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 December 15, 2013—Target confirmed that malware had been 
installed and that most of the malware had been removed.  
 December 16 and 17, 2013—Target notified payment processors and 
card networks that a breach had occurred.  
 December 18, 2013—Target removed the remaining malware.  
 December 19, 2013—Target made a public announcement of the 
breach.  
 December 27, 2013—Target announced the theft of the encrypted PIN 
data.  
 January 9, 2014—Target discovered the theft of PII.  
 January 10, 2014—Target announced the PII theft.210 
 
Just a few months after the cyber breach, Target CEO Gregg Steinhafel, a 35-
year company employee resigned.211  According to Congressional testimony 
provided by a Target executive, “an intruder used a vendor’s access to Target’s 
system to place malware on point-of-sale (POS) registers.  The malware captured 
credit and debit card information.”212  Almost two years after the Target breach, 
trade groups representing credit unions and community banks report expenses of 
more than $350 million “to reissue credit and debit cards and deal with other issues 




During November 2014, a cyber-attack was successfully waged against 
Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) resulting in a significant disruption of business 
operations, the destruction of computer systems, rendering inoperable thousands of 
company computers, and the theft of significant amounts of proprietary commercial 
information and the personally identifiable data and confidential communications of 
 
210. Id. at 3. 
211. Eric Basu, Target CEO Fired- Can You Be Fired If Your Company is Hacked?, FORBES June 
15, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericbasu/2014/06/15/target-ceo-fired-can-you-be-fired-if-your-co 
mpany-is-hacked/. 
212. See Weiss & Miller, supra note 209, citing Testimony of John J. Mulligan, executive vice 
president and chief financial officer, Target, before U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, Protecting Personal Consumer Information from Cyber Attacks and Data 
Breaches, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., March 26, 2014, at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files. 
Serve&File_id=c2103bd3-8c40-42c3-973b-bd08c7de45ef; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the 
Judiciary, Privacy in the Digital Age: Preventing Data Breaches and Combating Cybercrime, 113th 
Cong., 2nd sess., February 4, 2014, at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/02-04-14MulliganTesti 
mony.pdf, and U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, Protecting Consumer Information: Can Data 
Breaches Be Prevented?, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., February 5, 2014,  http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/ 
IF17/20140205/101714/HMTG-113-IF17-Wstate-MulliganJ-20140205.pdf.  
213. See Robin Sidel, Three Banks Put Kibosh On Target Pact, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2015, at C1.  
See also Robin Sidel, Small Lenders Cry Foul Over Breach Costs, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2015, at C1.   
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employees.214  Within hours following discovery of the network intrusion Sony 
reported this incident and requested FBI assistance.  State actor North Korea is 
alleged to have committed a major cyber-attack on the data systems of Sony 
Corporation in retaliation for a proposed Christmas day-release of the Hollywood 
motion picture spoofing a fictitious plan to assonate the leader of North Korea.215  
The FBI reports that 
Sony’s quick reporting facilitated the investigators’ ability to do 
their jobs, and ultimately to identify the source of these attacks.  As 
a result of our investigation, and in close collaboration with other 
U.S. government departments and agencies, the FBI now has enough 
information to conclude that the North Korean government is 
responsible for these actions. While the need to protect sensitive 
sources and methods precludes us from sharing all of this 
information, our conclusion is based, in part, on the following: 
 Technical analysis of the data deletion malware used in this 
attack revealed links to other malware that the FBI knows 
North Korean actors previously developed. For example, 
there were similarities in specific lines of code, encryption 
algorithms, data deletion methods, and compromised 
networks. 
 The FBI also observed significant overlap between the 
infrastructure used in this attack and other malicious cyber 
activity the U.S. government has previously linked directly to 
North Korea. For example, the FBI discovered that several 
Internet protocol (IP) addresses associated with known North 
Korean infrastructure communicated with IP addresses that 
were hardcoded into the data deletion malware used in this 
attack. 
 Separately, the tools used in the SPE attack have similarities 
to a cyber-attack in March of last year against South Korean 
banks and media outlets, which was carried out by North 
Korea. 
 
We are deeply concerned about the destructive nature of this attack 
on a private sector entity and the ordinary citizens who worked there. 
Further, North Korea’s attack on SPE reaffirms that cyber threats 
 
214. Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Update on Sony Investigation (Dec. 19, 2014), 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-on-sony-investigation (last viewed Mar. 5, 
2016). 
215. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing Cyberthreat, 33 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 230 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534119; Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, 
The SEC & The Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. (2015), http:// 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=1951148; Lawrence J. Trautman, The SONY Data Hack: Implications for World 
Order, (unpublished manuscript). 
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pose one of the gravest national security dangers to the United 
States. Though the FBI has seen a wide variety and increasing 
number of cyber intrusions, the destructive nature of this attack, 
coupled with its coercive nature, sets it apart. North Korea’s actions 
were intended to inflict significant harm on a U.S. business and 
suppress the right of American citizens to express themselves. Such 
acts of intimidation fall outside the bounds of acceptable state 
behavior.216  
 
The November 2014 breach was not Sony’s first major encounter with a 
massive breach.  About forty-three (43) months earlier, as the result of a 2011 
cyberattack, Sony shut down its PlayStation Network “on April 20 [2011] when it 
found evidence of an intrusion, but it didn’t reveal the data breach to users until April 
26.  The company said it didn’t know conclusively until April 25 that some personal 
information had been accessed.”217 
 
Other Data Breach Cases 
 
By now, reports of data breaches are widespread.218  To illustrate the enormity 
of this contemporary problem, in just one day alone while I was drafting this article, 
 
216. See Press Release, supra note 214. 
217. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Sony CEO Warns of “Bad New World,” WALL ST. J., May 18, 2011, 
at B1. 
218. See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. (2014), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2232471; Shelly Banjo, Home Depot Hackers Stole Buyer Email Addresses, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
7, 2014, at A1; Ian Brown, Lilian Edwards & Christopher Marsden, Information Security and 
Cybercrime, LAW AND THE INTERNET (3rd ed., L. Edwards, C. Waelde, eds., Oxford: Hart, 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1427776; Michael Calia, Breach Plagues Home Depot, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 
2014, at B3;Julia S. Cheney, Heartland Payment Systems: Lessons Learned from a Data Breach, FRB 
OF PHILADELPHIA - PAYMENT CARDS CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 10-1 (2010), http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=1540143; A. Michael Froomkin, Government Data Breaches, 24 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1019 
(2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1427964; Kevin Gatzlaff & Kathleen A. McCullough, The Effect of Data 
Breaches on Shareholder Wealth, 13 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 1 (2008),  http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1121172; Emily Glazer, Danny Yadron & Daniel Huang, Hackers May Have Targeted at Least 13 
Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2014, at C1; Lauren Henry, Information Privacy and Data Security, CARDOZO 
LAW REVIEW DE NOVO, 107 (2015),  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2600495; Trey Herr & Allan A. Friedman, 
Redefining Cybersecurity, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL - DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM 
BRIEF, No. 8, (Jan. 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2558265; David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Bank 
Hackers Steal Millions Via Malware,  N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2015 at A1; Susan Sproule & Francine 
Vachon, The Prevention and Mitigation of Breaches of Personal Information Databases: A Theoretical 
Framework, 11 J. TECH. & HUMAN USABILITY 1 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2511603; David Thaw, 
The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 287 (2014),  http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2241838;  David Thaw, Data Breach (Regulatory) Effects, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 151 (2015),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2595297; Sarah Oh, Estimates for Reasonable Data Breach Prevention (June 12, 
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2616968; Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber 
Vulnerabilities: Lessons from Stuxnet and the Internet of Things, (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2982629.  
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the Wall Street Journal reported news articles having the following headlines: 
“Israel-Linked Spyware Hit Iran Talks”219; “Reports: FEC Data Vulnerable to 
Hacks”220; and “France Says Russians Carried Out Cyberattack.”221  These 
disturbing reports of alleged nation-state cyber-attacks come just days after the cyber 
theft of personal employment “records of as many as four million people in one of 
the most far-reaching breaches of government computers.”222  Other deeply 
troubling headlines of recent data breaches include: “Russian Hackers Read 
Obama’s Unclassified Emails, Officials Say”223 and “Breach At IRS Exposes 
Returns.”224 
XI. DIGITAL AGE & CRISIS MANAGEMENT: SOCIAL MEDIA 
CHALLENGES 
 
Unlike one-way traditional communications mediums such as newspapers, 
radio and television—the Internet, Facebook and Twitter (immediate and bi-
directional) has resulted in new challenges to effective crisis management.  
Facebook has emerged as the dominant social network in the United States.  
Facebook reports a daily average of 1.28 billion active users during March 2017, 
with “approximately 85.8% of daily active users . . . outside the U.S. and Canada.”225 
 
Toyota 2010 Recall of 2.9 Million Vehicles 
Jay Rajasekera of the International University of Japan recalls the 
unprecedented global media coverage due to “Toyota’s brand name, its newly 
acquired title as the ‘No. 1 automaker in the world,’ and its rather lethargic response 
 
219. Adam Entous & Danny Yadron, Israel-Linked Spyware Hit Iran Talks, WALL ST. J., June 11, 
2015, at A1. 
220. Brody Mullins & Rebecca Ballhaus, Reports: FEC Data Vulnerable to Hacks, WALL ST. J., 
June 11, 2015, at A4. 
221. Sam Schechner, France Says Russians Carried Out Cyberattack, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2015, 
at A6. 
222. Devlin Barrett, Danny Yadron & Damian Paletta, Chinese Suspected in Huge Data Hack, 
WALL ST. J., June 5, 2015, at A1.  See also Devlin Barrett & Carol E. Lee, U.S. Unsure What Hackers 
Got, WALL ST. J., June 6-7, 2015, at A3; David E. Sanger & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Data Breach Tied to 
China Hits Millions, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2015, at A1; Damian Paletta, Security Clearance Forms 
Accessed In Federal Hack, WALL ST. J., June 13-14, 2015, at A1. 
223. Michael S. Schmidt & David E. Sanger, Russian Hackers Read Obama’s Unclassified Emails, 
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2015 at A1.  See also Laura Saunders, Tax ID Theft Victims Cite Woes 
With IRS, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2015, at A3. 
224. John D. McKinnon & Laura Saunders, Breach at IRS Exposes Returns, WALL ST. J., May 27, 
2015, at A1. 
225. Facebook, Newsroom, Company Info, Stats, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/  (last 
viewed June 7, 2017). 
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time to the incidents, some of which reportedly happened several years ago.”226  
Moreover, 
Once the media around the world started flashing the stunning news 
of the big recall of 2.9 million vehicles, on January 21, 2010, which 
was on top of the 3.9 million recalled just a few months prior, the 
reaction from all the corners, including Toyota’s own customers, the 
general public, the politicians, and the financial markets was 
unprecedented in Toyota’s history.  The total number of Toyota’s 
recalls related to the serious safety defect connected to sudden 
acceleration would eventually climb up to 8.6 million globally . . . . 
With Internet and social media such as Facebook and Twitter 
in full form, the negative news spread at unprecedented speed to 
Europe, China, and around the world, including Toyota’s home 
market of Japan… 
In the U.S., where hordes of lawyers could be in the waiting 
eagerly to help any victim or their families go up against Toyota, 
financial and punitive damages could be severe. . .  As soon as the 
big recall of 2.3 million vehicles was announced on January, 2010, 
Toyota ordered the dealers to temporarily suspend the sales of eight 
models involved in the recall for sticking accelerator pedal . . . . 
. . . the biggest challenge for Toyota is to maintain the public 
trust.  Indeed, voluntary recalls, if done in a timely manner, can help 
boost the trust of a company, as happened in previous Toyota recalls.  
However, the situation was different this time, because the company 
was in a way forced by the US government, which had received a 
significant influx of complaints.  This forced-recall definitely did not 
create a positive image for Toyota’s reputation which had been 
meticulously created over several decades through a carefully 
planned strategy and public relations campaigns . . . .227 
 
Armed with an MBA from Babson College in the United States and with less 
than a year’s experience as Toyoda president, Akio Toyoda faced a public relations 
crisis “when he was called to testify before the US Congress on February 23, 2010.  
Already under fire by the US media for not apologizing early and also not 
sufficiently, his performance, broadcasted live around the world, was a defining 
moment for Toyota and for corporate Japan.”228  Among the questions at the time: 
“[d]id he apologize enough?  Was his performance sincere?  Did it look like he was 
trying to conceal something?  Mr. Rajasekera observes that “A survey conducted by 
 
226. Jay Rajasekera, Crisis Management in Social Media and Digital Age: Recall Problem and 
Challenges to Toyota, Int’l University of Japan Graduate School of International Management Working 
Paper No. IM-2010-02 at 4 (2010), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1603027. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 7. 
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TV broadcaster CBS News in the US, following Mr. Toyoda’s testimony, the public 
did not rate Toyoda’s explanation very positively—overall only 27% believed that 
Toyoda was telling the truth; almost 50% said Toyoda was hiding something.”229 
 
Toyota’s Social Network Strategy 
Observing that “social media, if properly used, is also a way to keep an eye 
on the public mood when some significant issue that affects a large number of people 
occurs, such as the present recall which had raised emotions high in many Toyota 
customers,”230 Mr. Rajasekera concludes that “Toyota seemed to have realized the 
importance of SNS [Social Network Sites] early on.”231  Moreover, 
With manufacturing operations in 27 countries, and a dealer network 
in 170 countries, Toyota is a giant organization.  In any large 
organization, coordinating all the media releases, let they be for 
news papers, TV, or SNS, such as You Tube, Twitter, and Facebook, 
must be done carefully in order to prevent public confusion . . . .  As 
soon as the recall crisis started getting media attention, Toyota 
quickly put together an ‘Online Newsroom’ and a ‘social media 
strategy team’ to coordinate all the media releases from different 
organizations of the company, like public relations, customer 
services, and dealers. 
In addition to Toyota’s own efforts, anyone interested in 
knowing or wanting to express an opinion has the option to get on 
with any SNS media and exchange opinions. 
 
Among the SNS sites Toyota is operating include: 
 
 Twitter feeds; twitter.com/TOYOTA 
 Facebook; facebook.com/Toyota 
 YouTube; youtube.com/Toyota 
 YouTube USA; youtube.com/user/TototaUSA 
 Pressroom Toyota; pressroom.toyota.com/ 
In reasoning that the company had not had a major backlash 
from its customers, especially in the US, where media was providing 
sensational coverage around the clock, Toyota had stated that it had 
increased number of customers in its Facebook page.  That is true, 
Toyota fans to this SNS site has been growing about 10% monthly.  
But, the fact of the matter is that all the other major US brands had 
also been adding fans to their Facebook SNS sites as well.232 
 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 9. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
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Social Media Provides Immediate Feedback 
 
Mr. Rajasekera points out that a major benefit of social media “is that a 
company can gather practically real-time information about customer feelings or 
complaints.  A Toyota fan club, such as in Facebook, may not quite reflect all sides 
as the people joining it may already have a positive opinion about the brand.233  Mr. 
Rajasekera continues, 
 
In fact the recall process had opened up quite a few SNS groups 
attacking Toyota.  The company may want to tap into such groups 
as well to follow up on their messages from time to time.  In 
Facebook itself, one can see more than 10 such SNS groups, with 
revealing names such as ‘Anti-Toyota’, ‘Anti-Toyota Prius Group! 
and ‘anti prius movement.”234  But the total number of members in 
such groups is quite small—less than 1% of the number in Toyota’s 
official Facebook SNS.  What sends a signal of concern to Toyota 
may be the growth of the membership of such SNSs and the rate the 
members keep posting the messages; plus of course the contents 
within those messages. 
One SNS site that had been in operation well before the 
current round of recalls became a menace to Toyota is a public site 
called PRIUSchat.235 
 
XII. HAVE YOU CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING 
NIGHTMARE SCENARIOS? 
 
Reasonably foreseeable disasters are often industry specific: airlines (plane 
crashes); chemical and refineries (explosions); manufacturing (undiscovered defects 
or design flaws); oil and gas exploration (petroleum spills or explosions); 
pharmaceuticals (adverse reactions to or unknown dangers from prescription drugs); 
transportation (train wrecks, trucking accidents, etc.).  It seems difficult, if not 
impossible, to justify not planning for each of these circumstances.   
The “business judgment” rule is procedural; it’s critically important that the 
board and management have a documented history of diligent preparation for a 
reasonably foreseeable crisis.236  Here is a non-exhaustive list of a few other 
disruptive events which could escalate into crisis proportions given the right 
circumstances: 
 
233. Id. at 11. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. See Barton, supra note 162 at 8. 
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1.  CROP FAILURES IMPACTING SUPPLIES OF NECESSARY RAW 
MATERIALS 
 
Supply chain risk is a foreseeable problem that every business needs to 
consider. Mitigating risk by insurance, hedging, or some other appropriate 
strategy— or at least being cognizant of the nature of such risks is required. Supply 
chain risks come in many varieties.  Every enterprise should question the extent to 
which they are subject to supply chain risk and have contingencies in place when 
the disruption takes place. 
 
2. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (“FCPA”) VIOLATIONS 
 
With often devastating consequences, individuals and business entities of any 
size may run afoul of U.S. and international bribery and corruption laws.237  
Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price  have observed that “Increased international 
commerce between the United States and faster growing economies such as The 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as third world economies rich in natural 
resources but poor in infrastructure like Nigeria, have created the potential for 
significant exposure to international corruption.238  Accordingly, recent enforcement 
trends 
 
demand that U.S. directors understand the basic foundation for doing 
business without running afoul of the FCPA.  With an increasing 
demand for United States citizens to sit on boards dealing with 
significant exposure to emerging economies and Chinese 
developments, the FCPA has become an area that directors of both 
public and private companies alike cannot ignore. With the increase 
in business operations around the globe by U.S. companies, the risk 
associated with anti-bribery laws increases.  Any attempt to assess 
corporate risk for an FCPA violation requires an understanding of 
how the statute operates and is enforced.239 
 
237. Lawrence J. Trautman, U.S. Entrepreneurial Risk in International Markets: Focus on Bribery 
and Corruption, (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2912072.  See also Mike Koehler, 
An Examination of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Issues, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. (2013),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298644; Lawrence J. Trautman, Anthony “Tony” Luppino & Malika S. 
Simmons, Some Key Things U.S. Entrepreneurs Need to Know About The Law and Lawyers, 46 TEX. J. 
BUS. L. 155 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2606808; Lawrence J. Trautman, Following the Money: 
Lessons from the “Panama Papers,” Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 807 (2017), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2783503. 
238. Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Minefield for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145, 146 (2011).  See also Lawrence J. Trautman, American 
Entrepreneur in China: Potholes on the Silk Road to Prosperity, 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INT’L PROP. 
L. 427 (2012), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1995076.   
239. Id.  See also Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: An Update on Enforcement and SEC and DOJ Guidance, 41 SEC. REG. L. J. 241 (2013),  
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3. INTERNET DISRUPTION, OR DATA LOSS FROM VIRUS OR HACKER 
ATTACK 
 
Elsewhere, Trautman and Alterbaumer-Price provide common examples of 
undesired Information Technology risks, including: “business losses, reputational 
damage and a weakened competitive position; inability to obtain or measure a return 
from IT investments; failure of IT initiatives to bring the innovation and benefits 
they promised; technology that is inadequate or even obsolete; inability to leverage 
available new technologies; and deadlines that are not met and budgets that are 
overrun.”240  Many boards now recognize the value of having cyber expertise and 
are actively recruiting technology experience to their audit or risk committees.241 
 
4.  NATIONALIZATION OF ASSETS BY SOVEREIGNS 
 
History is chock full of instances of asset nationalization.  Recent examples 
of nationalization include: Bolivia (oil & gas);242 Cuba (all foreign-owned 
private);243 Iceland (banking);244 Ireland (banking);245  The Netherlands (insurance 
and banking);246 New Zealand (railway and airlines);247 Portugal (banking);248 
 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2293382; Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Lawyers, Guns and 
Money – The Bribery Problem and U.K. Bribery Act, 47 THE INT’L LAW. 481(2013), http://www.ssrn. 
com/abstract=2276738.   
240. Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 22, citing Board Briefing on IT Governance, 2d 
ed., IT Governance Institute, 2003 p. 8.  See also Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce and Electronic 
Payment System Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261 (2016), http://www.ssrn. 
com/abstract=2314119; Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 230 
(2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534119.  
241. See Joann S. Lubin, The Newest Board Member: Digital, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2015, at A1; 
Shelly Banjo, Wal-Mart Taps Tech Expert: Retailer Names 30-Year-Old Instagram CEO Kevin Systrom 
to Its Board, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2014, at B3.  See also Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s 
Responsibility for Director Selection and Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75 (2012), 
http://ssrn. com/abstract=1998489; Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee 
Financial Expert Under SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 205 (2013), 
http://www.ssrn. com/abstract=2137747.   
242. Carin Zissis, Bolivia’s Nationalization of Oil and Gas, Council on Foreign Relations (May 12, 
2006), http://www.cfr.org/economics/bolivias-nationalization-oil-gas/p10682. 
243. Hugh Thomas, Cuba; the Pursuit of Freedom, 224-252 (Harper & Row., 1971). 
244. See Crisis Report: Icelandic Ministers Were Negligent, Iceland Review Online, Dec. 4, 2010, 
http://www.icelandreview.com/icelandreview/search/news/Default.asp?ew_0_a_id=360575. 
245. Government Nationalises ‘Fragile’ Anglo Irish Bank, Irishtimes.com, Jan. 1, 2009, http:// 
www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2009/0116/1232059654021.html. 
246. Dutch Media Split Over Fortis Nationalization, Reuters, Oct. 4, 2008, http://www.reuters 
.com/article/2008/10/04/us-fortis-media-idUSTRE49314H20081004.  
247. The Rail ‘Turn-Around Plan, Kewi Rail, May 18, 2010, http://www.kiwirail.co.nz/uploads/ 
Publications%20and%20Reports/Overview%20of%20KiwiRails%20Turn-around%20plan.pdf.  
248. Portugal Announces Nationalization of Troubled BPN Bank, CHINA ECONOMIC NET, Nov. 3, 
2008, http://en.ce.cn/subject/financialcrisis/financialcrisiswr/200811/03/t20081103_17267231.shtml.  
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Sweden (banking);249 United Kingdom (banking, Rolls-Royce, British Leyland, 
British Rail and National Coal Board);250  United States (mortgage, banking 
automotive);251  and Venezuela (oil & gas, cement, steel, rice, glass-
manufacturing).252 
 
5. NATURAL DISASTERS (EARTHQUAKE, TORNADO OR HURRICANE) 
 
Anyone who has lived in Florida or along the U.S. Gulf of Mexico coastline 
understands the annual threat of hurricane season.  Years later, the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina (2005) continues to plague residents of New Orleans and the Gulf 
coast.   We have examined previously the tragedy caused by the March 11, 2011, 
earthquake and subsequent tsunami which resulted in the release of radiation into 
the nearby soil, air and sea.  “The twin catastrophes wiped out the normal power and 
backup generators of nearly all the Fukushima nuclear power plant’s six reactors”253 
 
6.  ADVERSE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS (TARIFFS, TRADE WARS, 
ETC.) 
 
Unexpected political developments in countries responsible for raw materials, 
manufacturing or significant market demand will be a topic deserving the attention 
of management and the board.  Adverse changes in these situations may not be 
readily foreseeable and may be the result of retaliatory tariffs or political events 
(such as government regime change) that cannot be readily anticipated. 
 
 
249. Carter Dougherty, Stopping a Financial Crisis, the Swedish Way, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/worldbusiness/23krona.html.  
250. Steve Schifferes, The Lessons of Nationalism, BBC News, Feb. 18, 2008, http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/business/7250252.stm; Northern Rock Confirms Job Cuts, BBC NEWS, Aug. 29, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7587718.stm; Graeme Wearden, Government to Spend £50bn to 
Part-Nationalize UK’s Banks, Guardian.co.uk, Oct. 8, 2008. 
251. Zachary A. Goldfarb, David Cho and Binyamin Appelbaum, Treasury to Rescue Fannie and 
Freddie, Washingtonpost.com, Sept. 7, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article 
/2008/09/06/AR2008090602540.html?hpid=topnews; Steven D. Levitt, Diamond and Kashyap on the 
Recent Financial Upheavals, Freakonomics.com, Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.freakonomics.com 
/2008/09/18/diamond-and-kashyap-on-the-recent-financial-upheavals/; and Micheline Maynard, A 
Primer on the New General Motors, N.Y. TIMES.COM, July 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/07/11/business/11primer.html.  
252. See Simon Romero and Clifford Krauss, Venezuelan Plan Shakes Investors, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 
10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/10/business/worldbusiness/10venezuela.html?ex=1169182 
800&en=07f6ff6cdd4c284a&ei=5070; Venezuela Nationalizes Private Steel Plant, CNN, Nov. 1, 2010, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-01/world/venezuela.nationalization_1_steel-plant-steel-mill-manufactur 
ing-plant?_s=PM:WORLD; and  Frank Jack Daniel, Venezuela to Nationalize U.S. Firm’s Oil Rigs, 
Reuters, June 24, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/24/us-venezuela-nationalizations-idUST 
RE65N0UM20100624. 
253. Phred Dvorak & Peter Landers, Japanese Plant Had Barebones Risk Plan, WALL ST. J., 
March 31, 2011, at A1. 
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7. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (I.E., AVIAN FLU, SWINE FLU, ETC.) 
 
While the influenza virus may have been with us since the beginning of time, 
according to many historians the first recognized instance of pandemic influenza 
seems to be 500 years ago, in year 1510 A.D.254  Public health doctor David M. 
Morens notes that “other influenza pandemics probably did occur earlier, and about 
those we can say that they are NOW recognized as probably being both influenza 
and being pandemic.”255  Laurence Barton reports that, “there have been 10 
pandemics over the past three centuries, the most notorious being the global flu of 
1918 that killed tens of millions of people.”256  Barton continues, 
 
If you fast-forward to 1976, over 400 people died near the banks of 
the Ebola River in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a result 
of a vicious, toxic pathogen.  While 400 people may seem pithy 
compared to the death toll in 1918, it was the manner in which the 
victims of the Ebola virus died that should make you lose sleep; 
some medical journals reported that the organs of some of the 
victims poured out of their bodies within days of contracting the 
virus.  Some in the medical community are concerned that if such a 
virus were to spread again (it had a whopping 95 percent fatality 
rate), the impact could be unprecedented.  If local officials had not 
immediately burned affected bodies after the initial outbreak, some 
scientists have concluded that it was theoretically possible that the 
human race could have been obliterated within three months.  This 
is no exaggeration: It was that bad.257 
 
254. See David M. Morens, Jeffery K. Taubenberger, Gregory K. Folkers, and Anthony S. Fauci, 
Pandemic Influenza’s 500th Anniversary, CLIN. INFECT. DIS. (2010) 51 (12): 1442-1444. 
255. E-mail from David M. Morens, M.D., CAPT, United States Public Health Service, Senior 
Advisor to the Director, Office Of the Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 
National Institutes of Health, to Lawrence J. Trautman (July 6, 2015 10:18 CST) (on file with author). 
256. See Laurence Barton, supra note 162 at 109. 
257. Id. 
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Recent threats include the 2014-15 ebola scare,258 the 2015 South Korean outbreak 
of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS),259 and the 2016 spread of Zika 
virus.260  From these examples, it seems clear that the threat of pandemic influenza 
is a scenario that every board should contemplate and discuss.  Barton believes, 
 
Whenever “it” hits—whatever “it” is—its impact on the companies 
we own or work for will be devastating.  The flu is a virus and as 
such will necessitate the mass development of a specific vaccine, a 
process that likely will take months to complete.  Antibiotics are 
useful, but they are only effective in treating secondary illnesses 
caused by the flu.  What’s more, their availability would likely be 
limited only to those who can afford them.  Crossing national 
borders and traveling internationally could be indefinitely limited or 
suspended.  A travel or shipping embargo could be enacted (Canada 
shuts its borders to all international air traffic in 2003 following a 
bird flu outbreak) once it becomes clear that the virus has infected 
an alarming number of victims . . . .  [M]ost companies have never 
taken the time to ask: What if 30 percent of all of our employees 
become sick and incapable of working?  What if our products were 
impounded at port terminals and held for months?  What if 
customers simply stop buying our product merely because they are 
hunkered down at home?261 
If a pandemic were to force curtailments in global trade, even 
for thirty days, imagine the impact: Commerce conducted via ports 
and worldwide rail stations could be suspended, and truck, tanker 
ship, and airliner traffic could be slowed or stopped.  Products won’t 
 
258. See Betsy McKay & Peter Wonacott, After Slow Ebola Response, World Seeks to Avoid 
Repeat, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2014, at A1; Betsy McKay, West African Nations Struggle to Rebuild 
Health-Care After Ebola, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2015, at A1; Jack Nicas, Ana Campoy & Betsy McKay, 
New Push To Check Spread of Ebola, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2014, at A1; Drew Hinshaw, For Want of 
Gloves, Ebola Doctors Die, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16-17, 2014, at A1; Betsy McKay, Miguel Bustillo & 
Melinda Beck, Ebola Case Puts Focus on Safeguards, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2014, at A1; Scott Gottlieb 
& Tevi Troy, Opinion, Stopping Ebola Before It Turns Into a Pandemic, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4-5, 2014, at 
A13; Bradley Hope, Virus Hunter Goes After Epidemics, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2015, at C2; Betsy 
McKay, Ebola Proves Persistent in Guinea, Where Crisis Started, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2015, at A10; 
Manny Fernandez, Ebola Crisis Brings Abundance of Caution Into a Dallas Community, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 4, 2014 at A13; Kevin Sack, Jack Healy & Frances Robles, Life in Quarantine: 21 Days of Fear and 
Loathing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2014 at A1; Manny Fernandez, Michael D. Shear & Abby Goodenough, 
Texas Narrows Ebola Focus to 10 Considered to Be at Greatest Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2014 at A1; 
Alan Feuer, News Analysis, The Ebola Conspiracy Theories, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2014 at 5; Peter 
Loftus, Ebola Drug Trial Is Suspended, WALL ST. J., June 20-21, 2015, at B4. 
259. See generally Alastair Gale & Kwanwoo Jun, South Korea Said to Falter Early in Outbreak, 
WALL ST. J., June 10, 2015, at A7. 
260. Betsy McKay, New Studies Tie Zika More Closely to Impairments, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5-6, 
2016 at A3. 
261. See Laurence Barton, supra note 162 at 110. 
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be shipped (food rots in storage), services can’t be sold (your 
customers are home tending to the sick, and income will come to a 
halt (no mail or delivery service; IT servers may be on autopilot—
but remember that your data recovery people are also out sick).  Yet 
your employees will still expect to be paid, because somehow—
magically!—the banks that oversee our mortgages and car payments 
will still expect their payments.262 
 
The U.S. financial regulators have recognized the serious threat of pandemic, 
observing,  
 
For almost 100 years, the nation has not had reason to plan for a 
protracted absentee rate of 30 to 50 percent of a firm’s personnel for 
four to six weeks in waves over a 12 to 18-month period; yet today 
firms are working to find ways to contain the spread of such an 
influenza, protect employees, and maintain continuity of critical 
business operations.263 
 
8. PROLONGED POWER DISRUPTION 
 
As might be expected, the financial services industry has been 
focused on the impact of prolonged power disruption for some time.  
Others may learn from this industry’s experience.  During the early 
1990s, the SEC  
 
[E]stablished a number of programs to improve the 
resiliency of this critical financial sector. For example, in 
the early 1990s, the Commission established its 
Automation Review Policy ("ARP") and a cadre of 
specialized staff to review the capacity and resiliency of 
the securities markets and clearing organizations.  The 
Commission's ARP staff inspects the information 
technology systems of these entities and controls over 
those systems, participates in periodic comprehensive 
evaluations of these systems, and issues 
 
262. Id.  See also Bradly J. Condon & Tapen Sinha, Chronicle of a Pandemic Foretold: Lessons 
from the 2009 Influenza Epidemic, (2009) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1398445.   
263. See Joint Report on Efforts of the Private Sector to Implement the Interagency Paper on Sound 
Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System, U.S. Board of Governors of the Fed. 
Res. System, Office of the Compt. of the Currency & Sec. and Exchange Commission Report (Apr. 27, 
2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/studies/2006/soundpractices.pdf. 
TRAUTMAN MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2017  3:23 PM 
342 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:3 
recommendations for improvements in these programs as 
necessary . . .  The Commission has worked extensively 
with the markets and clearing organizations since the 
tragic events of September 11th to improve their capacity 
to withstand wide-scale disruptions. These efforts have 
included fostering the development of backup data 
centers and trading floors, as well as agreements between 
markets to serve as backup trading venues for each 
other's securities if events warrant. The Commission has 
also worked with other regulators to establish best 
practices guidelines to strengthen the resilience of core 
clearance and settlement organizations.  The SEC has 
supplemented these efforts by issuing a Policy Statement 
that sets forth certain basic principles of business 
continuity planning, including a next-day resumption 
goal, that should be applied by the trading markets . . .264 
 
The Northeast Power Grid Failure 
 
The northeast power grid failure of August 14–15, 2003 was a 
crisis “triggered not by terrorists but by a severe, cascading power 
outage [that] caused a major blackout [and] left 50 million people in 
eight states and two Canadian provinces without electricity.”265  The 
scope of this power failure “clearly demonstrated that the financial 
services sector, transportation services, telecommunications sector, 
water system and electric power grid are all interconnected.”266  The 
SEC 
 
[W]as consult[ing] repeatedly with officials at the 
securities markets and clearing organizations within the 
affected areas in the greater New York metropolitan 
region. In addition, the staff conducted a series of 
conference calls during the outage that provided 
opportunities for markets and clearing organizations 
 
264. See Written Statements of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning the 
Performance of the Securities Markets During the Northeast Power Outage and Hurricane Isabel, SEC 
(Oct. 20, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts102003sec.htm. 
265. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8 at 4.  
266. See Business Roundtable, supra note 8 at 66.  
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outside of New York to hear directly from the affected 
organizations concerning how they were coping with the 
power failure and how they planned to operate under 
these conditions . . . .267 
 
Some of the commentators to the draft Interagency Paper on Sound 
Practices to Strengthen the resilience of the U.S. Financial System 
stated that  
 
The description of a wide-scale, regional disruption 
should include parameters for a range of probable events 
(e.g., power disruption, natural disaster) and include the 
expected duration of the outage (e.g., 5, 10, or 30 days) . 
. . .  The commenters agree that a within-the-business-
day recovery and resumption objective for core clearing 
and settlement organizations is appropriate and 
acknowledge that a two-hour recovery time objective is 
an achievable goal, although somewhat aggressive for 
some because of the volume and complexity of 
transaction data involved. There is general consensus 
that the end-of-business-day recovery objective is 
achievable for firms that play significant roles in critical 
markets, although many state that this is possible only if 
firms are able to utilize synchronous data storage 
technologies, which can limit the extent of geographic 
separation between primary and back-up sites . . . .  A 
number of commenters support the concept of 
establishing back-up sites for operations and data centers 
that do not rely on the same infrastructure and other risk 
elements as primary sites and note that such 
diversification of risk is a long-standing principle of 
business continuity planning for financial firms.268   
 
 
267. Written Statements of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning the 
Performance of the Securities Markets During the Northeast Power Outage and Hurricane Isabel, SEC 
(Oct. 20, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts102003sec.htm.  
268. Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial 
System, SEC Release No. 34-47638 (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/34-47638.htm.  
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Power outages are a concern for those doing business in many major industrial 
countries.  The largest known power blackout in history on July 31, 2012 is estimated 
to have left a population of 680 million in India without power, wreaking “havoc on 
businesses and travelers.  About 200 trains stopped operating for several hours.  
Metro rail services in New Delhi and its suburbs were halted.  About 270 miners 
were stuck in two underground coal mines in eastern India as elevators stopped 
working.”269  The second-worse event is believed to have taken place the prior day 
in India, impacting “a population of 370 million, followed by a 2005 outage in 
Indonesia that left almost 100 million in the dark.”270  During late 2015, Ted Koppel 
publishes a nightmare scenario involving a cyberattack on the U.S. power grid, with 
devastating results.271  Given the 2015 terrorist attacks on Paris272 and elsewhere, 
Koppel’s foreshadowing seems far from science fiction. 
 
9. STRIKES AND LABOR ACTIONS 
 
Labor strikes and work actions seem to be a daily fact of life.  For example, 
the following strikes were reported (not an exhaustive list) while writing this article: 
a strike at the world’s largest copper mine;273 the U.S. National Football League 
lockout;274 a state government workers strike in Wisconsin;275 the New York police 
union;276 and the NBA lockout.277  If you rely on a sole source for critical materials 
or parts, an unforeseen strike or labor action may result in a crisis for you. 
 
10. TERRORISM EVENTS 
 
269. Amol Sharma, Saurabh Chaturvedi & Santanu Choudhury, India’s Power Network Breaks 
Down, WALL ST. J., August 1, 2012, at A8. 
270. Id. 
271. See generally Ted Koppel, LIGHTS OUT: A CYBERATTACK; A NATION UNPREPARED; 
SURVIVING THE AFTERMATH (Crown Pub. 2015). 
272. See Higgins & Schreuer, supra note 9.  See also Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack The 
Next Pearl Harbor?, 18 N.C. J.L & TECH. 232 (2016),  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2711059. 
273. Anthony Esposito, Strike at Chile Escondida Copper Mine in Day 5, Market Watch (July 25, 
2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/Story/story/print?guid=584FFADE-C793-4CCD-87EA-665F437E6E9F. 
274. Ralph Vacchiano, NFL Lockout Will Continue For a Few More Weeks, Judge Urges League 
& Players to Start Talking Again, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6, 2011, 10:48 p.m.), http://www.nydaily 
news.com/sports/football/nfl-lockout-continue-weeks-judge-urges-league-players-start-talking-article-
1.109747. 
275. Labor Organizers Consider General Strike in Wisconsin as Gov. Scott Walker Refuses to 
Negotiate Over Anti-Union Bill, DEMOCRACY NOW (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.democracynow.org/ 
2011/3/1/frank_emspak_of_workers_independent_news.  
276. Editorial, Gov. Cuomo’s Breakthrough Labor Agreement With Police Union is Fair for 
Workers, New York Taxpayers, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.nydailynews. 
com/opinion/gov-cuomo-breakthrough-labor-agreement-police-union-fair-workers-new-york-taxpay 
ers-article-1.109802. 
277. Mitch Lawrence, Lakers’ Derek Fisher Says NBA Players are ‘Frustrated’ by Labor 
Negotiations as Lockout Looms, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 9, 2011), http://www.nydaily 
news.com/sports/basketball/lakers-derek-fisher-nba-players-frustrated-labor-negotiations-lockout-loom 
s-article-1.128382.  
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Laurence Barton contends that every organization needs to assess four 
fundamental issues related to terror awareness 
 
1. How exposed is your organization? 
2. How would you notify and evacuate your employees in the event 
of a threat or incident? 
3. How will your enterprise achieve its goals and objectives (after 
all, that is why you are in business) 
4. Do you have sufficient insurance to sustain your organization after 
a calamity?278 
 
Best practice would suggest that boards “should always act on the assumption 
that you could be a direct or secondary target in a major terrorist attack.  Even if a 
weapon of mass destruction (WMD) or another calamity does not directly impact 
your business, historically the impact of terror on business has been profound.”279  
To further develop the point, Barton suggests that boards should consider the wider 
impact range including 
 
 Immediate loss of life and survivors who must grapple with permanent 
injuries. 
 Traumatized employees, customers, and others who witness an attack 




Since the beginning of time, with the exception of brief interludes, war seems 
to be a fixture of the human condition.  As Palmer and Perkins observe “[w]ar needs 
no documentation to prove its horrors.  It destroys and ruins lives beyond number; 
it makes anything like normal existence impossible; it imposes immense burdens on 
national economies and imperils the freedoms of everyone; it endangers man’s very 




Technology is inextricably linked with the other issues enumerated in this 
paper. New solutions and new problems will likely arise as technological 
advancement marches forward.  Over half a century ago, John von Neumann 
discussed this in Fortune magazine, “[t]echnological evolution is still accelerating.  
 
278. See Barton, supra note 162, at 175. 
279. Id. 
280. Barton, supra note 162, at 175. 
281. NORMAN D. PALMER & HOWARD C. PERKINS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE WORLD 
COMMUNITY IN TRANSITION 211 (2nd ed. 1957), https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/006693757 (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2017). 
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Technologies are always constructive and beneficial, directly or indirectly.  Yet their 
consequences tend to increase instability . . . .”282  He also warned that “[a]ll 
experience shows that even smaller technological changes than those now in the 
cards profoundly transform political and social relationships.  Experience also shows 
that these transformations are not a priori predictable and that most contemporary 
‘first guesses’ concerning them are wrong.”283 
XIII. IMPACT OF A CRISIS ON DIRECTOR TENURE AND 
BOARD COMPOSITION 
Succession Planning 
Companies must have a plan of succession in place in case top executives are 
incapacitated or die.  Only two things are certain in life: death and taxes, so 
companies should plan for both.  Examples of unplanned corporate successions are 
numerous.284  David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan report that succession planning 
seems to be focused on compliance at many companies, “rather than operational 
(i.e., the company has a list of potential candidates but could not name a permanent 
successor . . . immediately).”  According to survey data, “39 percent of companies 
report having zero ‘ready now’ internal candidates to fill the CEO role.”285 
Incredibly, “on average, boards spend only 2 hours per year discussing 
succession.”286  Every board of directors should think about the unthinkable and 
create a contingency plan in case a disaster, like an airplane crash, takes the lives of 
several board members or key managers all at once.  Planning for the continuation 
of governance is a fundamental duty of every board,287 particularly during a crisis.  
The Business Roundtable stresses that 
 
282. John von Neumann, Can We Survive Technology, FORTUNE (June 1955), reprinted in ROBERT 
L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., POLITICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, 247 (1969).  
283. Von Neumann, supra note 282, at 251. 
284. See Robin Sidel & Joann S. Lubin, AmEx President Dies on Plane, WALL ST. J., (May 29, 
2015, 6:27 p.m.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/american-express-ed-president-gilligan-dies-1432925 
490; Justin Scheck & David Gauthier-Villars, Total CEO de Margerie Embraced Risky Investments, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2014, 3:24 p.m.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shares-in-total-recover-strongly-
after-opening-lower-1413883822; Lalitha Naveen, Management Turnover And Succession Planning In 
Firms (Arizona State University Working Paper, 2000), http://ssrn.com/abstract=219931. 
285. DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, ROCK CENTER FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT 
STANFORD, CLOSER LOOK SER. NO. CGRP-16, SEVEN MYTHS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (June 1, 
2011), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/publications/seven-myths-corporate-governance.  
286. Id. 
287. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for Director 
Selection and Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75 (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1998489; Anup 
Agrawal, Charles R. Knoeber & Theofanis Tsoulouhas, CEO Succession: Insiders versus Outsiders, 
(2000), http://ssrn.com/abstract=213629; Shawn Mobbs & Charu G. Raheja, Internal Managerial 
Promotions: Insider Incentives and CEO Succession, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1337 (2012), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1102688; Noam Wasserman, Nitin Nohria & Bharat N. Anand, When Does Leadership Matter? 
The Contingent Opportunities View of CEO Leadership (Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 
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CEOs must consider the impact that security events have on 
employees and, in turn, on operations and resilience.  Consider a 
scenario in which a corporation’s critical business continuity experts 
cannot be flown to the problem site.  CEO and board involvement 
are especially pressing, for example, when designing CEO 
succession strategies.  How a company will function if the CEO, 
other senior managers and large numbers of employees are harmed 
deserves serious deliberation.288 
 
Because executive teams tend to be located in close proximity, best practice suggests 
that consideration be given to “having someone in another location who could take 
over in a crisis.  To assure business continuity in the event of a disaster, a corporation 
also should have information about employees available at several different 
locations, not just at a central headquarters.”289 
XIV. LESSONS LEARNED  
 
Despite the countless mistakes that have been made, we have come to learn 
better ways to deal with disasters.  Here are some tips to consider and apply when 
crisis strikes: 
 
1. Treat those injured with respect and dignity; 
2. Have your team and contingency plans in place; 
 
01-063, Jan. 2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract=278652; John Harry Evans, Nandu J. Nagarajan & Jason D. 
Schloetzer, CEO Turnover and Retention Light: Retaining Former CEOs on the Board, 48 J. ACCT. RES. 
1015 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600799; MATTEO TONELLO, JOHN C. WILCOX & JUNE 
EICHBAUM, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, EXECUTIVE ACTION SER. NO. 312, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD IN 
TURBULENT TIMES: CEO SUCCESSION PLANNING (Aug. 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448021; 
Robert C. Giambatista, W. Glenn Rowe & Suhaib Riaz, Nothing Succeeds Like Succession: A Critical 
Review of Leader Succession Literature Since 1994, 16 LEADERSHIP Q. 963 (2005), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1403431; DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, ROCK CENTER FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AT STANFORD, CLOSER LOOK SER. NO. CGRP-05, CEO SUCCESSION PLANNING: WHO’S BEHIND DOOR 
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3. Follow COSO’s guidance290 on examining enterprise risk management 
[ERM]: 
a. Discuss the company’s risk management philosophy and risk 
appetite; 
b. Understand ERM practices;  
c. Regularly review your portfolio of risks relative to risk appetite; 
and 
d. Always be apprised of the most significant enterprise risks and 
responses. 
4. Benefit from having previously conducted crisis drills, so that 
employees have thought about likely problems and have the essence of 
a plan in place;  
5. Get the facts as soon as possible (very often initial situational 
awareness reports are inaccurate); 
6. Control communications with all stakeholders & address their need to 
be informed; 
7. Have a dedicated crisis manager in place that is responsible for keeping 
up with potential threats, maintaining crisis contingency plans, and 
acts as a liaison with appropriate government officials; and 
8. Obtain experienced legal, accounting, compliance and crisis guidance. 
 
Ethics and Public Policy 
History teaches that some of us will be responsible corporate leaders and 
discharge our fiduciary duties of care by protecting crucial corporate assets, in 
particular, human life.  Some of us during crises or in preparation for foreseeable 
disasters will be responsible citizens and recognize the sanctity of life by treating 
our fellow human beings with dignity and respect.  Unfortunately, history also shows 
that others among us will be motivated to seek profit at the expense of the health and 
well-being of others.  Acknowledging history, some propose that “[w]hen instances 
of corporate misconduct lead to death or grievous bodily injury, those cases should 
be a top priority and [the] DOJ should use every available resource and tool to 
prosecute not only the responsible companies but, more importantly, the individuals 
responsible for the criminal conduct.”291  For this reason, Professor Jane Barrett 
contends that “[t]he only way to hold scofflaw businesses accountable is to hold the 
individuals who make the decisions that lead to the criminal conduct 
accountable.”292  Professor Barrett further observes that 
 
290. COSO has continued to publish guidance on ERM since releasing its Enterprise Risk 
Management – Integrated Framework in 2004.  See, e.g., PATCHIN CURTIS, PH.D. & MARK CAREY, 
DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, RISK ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE (Oct. 2012). 
291. Jane F. Barrett, When Business Conduct Turns Violent: Bringing BP, Massey, and Other 
Scofflaws to Justice, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 287, 332 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1864612.  
292. Id. 
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[D]eath as a result of industrial activity is not an aberration nor is it 
likely to stop without more aggressive enforcement.  The litany of 
the names of those killed during the last decade in ‘industrial 
accidents’ is far too long.  What is sadder still is that many of these 
were preventable deaths. . . . Every life that is lost due to a 
preventable industrial event is one life too many.  As a society, we 
place a very high value on human life and hard work.  The 
enforcement of our laws should reflect these values and protect 
people, particularly workers from [those] who needlessly gamble 
worker lives and our environment for financial benefits or career 
advancement.  It is past time to seriously address the trivialization 
of public safety crimes committed by corporate executives, 
managers, employees and agents.293  
 
Proposed Legislation 
According to Professor Barrett, “Congress has a model from which to build a 
criminal negligence felony for those who gamble with the lives of their employees 
and the general public while engaging in inherently dangerous business activities. 
 . . . the Seaman’s Manslaughter Law.”294  A similar punishment could be 
considered, “a violation of the Seaman’s Manslaughter Law is a felony punishable 
by ten years in jail.”295 
XV. CONCLUSION 
Creating a clear strategy and implementation plan for foreseeable industry 
disasters—before they occur, helps prevent mistakes made under stressful 
conditions.  Low probability but survival-threatening disasters such as the BP Gulf 
of Mexico oil spill, or natural disasters such as the March 11, 2011, Japanese 
earthquake and tsunami, constitute any board’s worse nightmare.  But companies 
need to be awake, alert, and think about the unthinkable before, even by a slim 
chance, it happens. An attempt has been made to draw lessons from each of these 
disasters and explore how those lessons may be applied more generally across all 
industries when crises strike.  While effective risk management is perhaps the topic 
highest on every board's agenda, it is imperative that thought be given to what a 
board might expect to confront when a corporate disaster strikes and how they will 
manage during crisis itself.  
 
293. Id. ar 332–33. 
294. Id. at 330, citing Act of July 7, 1838, § 12, 5 Stat. 304, 306 (“This statute criminalizes 
‘misconduct, negligence or inattention to duties,’ by a captain, engineer, pilot or other person employed 
on a vessel, that leads to the death of a person.  It is also a crime to cause the death of a person by ‘fraud, 
neglect, connivance, misconduct or violation of law.”). 
295. Id. citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1115, 3559 (2006). 
TRAUTMAN MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2017  3:23 PM 
350 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:3 
Despite the best efforts of management to focus on industrial safety, nuclear 
energy and extractive industries such as oil and gas or coal mining appear to be 
inherently dangerous over long periods of time such that fatal accidents are 
inevitable.  Experience teaches us that human error or natural phenomena will 
continue to plague these companies and more disasters are forthcoming.  Therefore, 
every board should consider what actions they will take when the foreseeable crisis 
occurs. 
 
 
